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Cultural and Institutional Memory as (a) Means of Progress (Part I)

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Foreword

A very important field of research, especially since the 1990s, memory is, for Henri Bergson in his *Matter and Memory* (1896/1911), a mental process referred to as the “memory of words” (XVIII) and as the difference between “perception and recollection” (73), where “perception” is defined as a “series of pictorial but discontinuous views of the universe” (77), and “recollection” as “the representation of an absent object” (84).

In his discussion, Bergson starts from three hypotheses: 1. the past survives under two different forms first, in motor mechanisms; secondly, in independent recollections; 2. the recognition of a present object is effected by movements when it proceeds from the object, by representations when it issues from the subject; 3. We pass by imperceptible stages, from recollections strung out along the course of time to the moments which indicate their nascent or possible action in space (90).

The third hypothesis is also divided into two forms of memory: the first, referring to lessons learnt by heart, the second, to repeated readings. In the first case, we are talking about a habit, in the second, about each reading becoming a different recollection. In the first case, the memory of the lesson “requires a definite time, the time necessary to develop one by one, were it only in imagination, all the articulatory movements that are necessary: it is no longer a representation, it is an action. It is part of my present. It is lived and acted, rather than represented” (91).

With Bergson, we have the so-called “memory-images” (95), which record every detail of every event in our daily lives, in their chronological order, “leaving to each fact, to each gesture, its place and date. Regardless of utility or of practical application, it stores up the past by the mere necessity of its own nature. By this memory is made possible the intelligent, or rather intellectual, recognition of a perception already experienced (93).

According to Bergson, the “learnt” memories are more useful and, in time, they become more and more impersonal, more and more foreign to our past life, when that lesson is better known. The mechanism of learning by heart is used every time we really want to know something.

Two different forms of memory means two different forms of storing up the past: motor mechanisms and memory-images. The mechanisms follow the direction of nature and remain dependent upon our will. The memory-images are spontaneous and “and as capricious in reproducing as it is faithful in preserving” (103).

“Recognition” is another concept in Bergson’s theory: to recognize something means to insert something “mentally in its former surroundings” (106), to “associate with a present perception the images which were formerly given in connection with it” (106). Memory chooses “one after the other, various analogous images which it launches in the direction of the new perception” (125), thus making us constantly create or reconstruct. In terms of “recognition,” we have two different categories of lost memories: the abrupt process, when one forgets certain words, figures, all the words of a language, a process caused by violent shocks. Here, Bergson considers that the apparently destroyed memories are actually present and acting. The second is a progressive process through which everything disappears “by a methodical and grammatical order [...]: proper names go first, then common nouns, lastly verbs” (150).

One last important idea in Bergson’s definition is the difference between “picturing” and “remembering,” the example being the remembrance of pain. Thus, as he argues, “the more I strive to recall a past pain, the nearer I come to feeling it in reality” (175). But, he wonders, “Was the memory of a pain, when it began, really pain?” (175) Then he defines the “present,” “my present,” as having “one foot

in my past and another in my future" (178). One foot in the past, because that is what the moment of speaking has already become; and one foot in the future, because that is where I am heading to. The "present" is also the only moment that seems real to us, the past is not here anymore, it is like a "ghost whose mysterious apparition must be explained by special causes and that conditions our present state, without being its necessary determinant" (188).

The present moment is the shortest of all, it is either not here yet, or it has already passed. On the other hand, if we define it as "actually lived by consciousness, we may say that this present consists, in large measure, in the immediate past" (195).

Depending on how people react to memories and to the present, Bergson divides them into three categories: the man of impulse, the dreamer and the man of good sense. The first is the one who lives only in the present, to which he reacts immediately, like the lower animals. The second is the man who lives only in the past, "for the mere pleasure of living there" (199), and whose memories are of no use for the present situation. The third and best type is the man whose memories "follow with precision all the outlines of the present situation, but energetic enough to resist all other appeal" (199).

That is, Bergson argues:

The function of the body is not to store up recollections, but simply to choose, in order to bring back to distinct consciousness, by the real efficacy thus conferred on it, the useful memory, that which may complete and illuminate the present situation with a view to ultimate action. It is true that this second choice is much less strictly determined than the first, because our past experience is an individual and no longer a common experience, because we have always many different recollections equally capable of squaring with the same actual situation, and because nature cannot here, as in the case of perception, have one flexible rule for delimiting our representations. (235)

From the definition of memory as mental process, we may pass on to the way this is transmitted from generation to generation. One such example would be M.T. Clancy's *From Memory to Written Record—England 1066-1307*, which starts with the following statement: "a difference between this book and some previous studies of records by historians is that it tries to avoid being prejudiced in favor of literacy" (7).

"Literacy," as one of Clancy's main concepts, is defined here in two opposite ways: literacy today versus literacy in the medieval period. Although the book focuses on England, the idea may be expanded to the entire Europe, as Marta Mangini's article in the present volume—"Looking at the Changes of Writing Materials in Italian Medieval Records"—will prove.

As the author argues, today literacy is the product of an "industrialized schooling process" (Clancy 8) and the proof of the "individual's integration into society" (8), of the "successful child" (8) and of the "employable adult" (8). Through literacy, ideological and cultural prejudices are transmitted and perpetuated, and xenophobia, racism and militarism are promoted.

By contrast, medieval educated people were not defined by literacy: they ratified their documents with crosses, "the most solemn symbol of Christian truth" (8). Speaking of Christianity, literacy also meant religion, that is, the scripture and the individual prayer. During the 17th and 18th centuries, people were supposed to "learn to read the word of God" (14) and they were taught mostly by pastors and priests.

M.T. Clancy's thesis is that it was bureaucracy which gave birth to lay literacy, not a desire to educate people. It was "this accumulation of documents and their bureaucratic use" which "made more people literate" (21).

Back to the present, the author is skeptical about the future of the so far dominating writing-printing technologies from papyrus to printed paper, due to the new "non-literate forms of communication, like the TV and videos, and of electronic and photographic systems of storing and retrieving information" (21). At the same time, he sees a potential perpetuation of the written word and of the paper, through "word processors and fax machines" (21).

Collective memory and cultural identity represent our next step, after the written word as such, in the view of Jan Assman and John Czaplika in *Collective Memory and Cultural Identity* (1995). These key notions will be also found later in Jahara Hines's article "Collective Memory in a Prosumer Society."

Collective or social memory is the "result of socialization and customs" (Assman and Czaplika 125), while communicative memory, another important concept for Assman and Czaplika, means every day communications and oral history. This type of memory is not specialized; it is unstable and disorganized and has its roles. Here, the two authors contradict the previous theory according to which "every individual memory constitutes itself in communication with others" (127), these others being groups such as families, the neighborhood, professional groups, political parties, associations, even nations, "who conceive their unity and peculiarity through a common image of their past" (127). For them, we have the notion "concretion of identity," which means that "a group bases its consciousness of unity and specificity upon this knowledge and derives formative and normative impulses from it, which allows the group to reproduce its identity" (128).

Cultural memory, a concept that will be later discussed by the next four contributors to the present volume—"A Meeting Place between the Individual and the Collective" (Mariselda Tesarolo), "In the Indelible Footprints of Truth: Writing Narrative History, Finding Historical Narrative" (Gregory Dekter), "The British Interregnum: A Yesterday that Never Happened" (Mervyn Hagger and Eric Gilder) and "The Higher *Raison D'Etat* and the Supreme Imperative of World Peace, as Decisive Factors for all Signatories of the Trianon Treaty (1920-1921) in Its Final Stages. The Treaty Ratification by Romania" (Alexandru Porțeanu)—implies a cultural formation (texts, rites, monuments) and institutional communication (recitation, practice, observance).

This type of memory can also be transmitted through posters, postage stamps, costumes, customs and it has several characteristics: "the concretion of identity" (Assman and Czaplika 130), the "capacity to reconstruct" (130), the way it is formed and its "reflexivity" (133). It identifies a group as "we are this" or "that's our opposite" (130). It reconstructs the past according to the contemporary context: sometimes it appropriates the past, sometimes it criticizes it, sometimes it preserves or transforms it.

Cultural memory is defined by linguistic, pictorial or ritual formation, thus arriving at the trinity of the Greek mysteries: legomenon (utterance), dromenon (action) and deiknymenon (display). It is "practice-reflexive" (132) in the sense that it is transmitted through proverbs, maxims, "ethno-theories" (132) and rituals. It is "self-reflexive" (132) because it "explains, distinguishes, reinterprets, criticizes, censures, controls" (132) the past. And it is "reflexive" (132) because it preserves-constructs "the self-image of the group through a preoccupation with its own social system" (132).

Thus, cultural memory, understood as "that body of reusable texts, images and rituals specific to each society in each epoch, whose 'cultivation' serves to stabilize and convey that society's self-image" (132), differs from one society to another. This "self-image" may be the sacred scriptures, or a ritual, or a language. Different groups remember their past differently, some see it as guidance, some want to dismiss it altogether. As the two authors argue, "which past becomes evident in that heritage and which values emerge in its identificatory appropriation tells us much about the constitution and tendencies of a society" (133).

The end of the 20th century was, as the same Jan Assman argues in *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance and Political Imagination* (1992/2011), both the beginning of the artificial memory and the end of that generation who had witnessed "some of the most terrible crimes and catastrophes in the whole of human history" (vii).

Since 2010, the field has also expanded from archaeology and comparative literature to history, arts and politics. In his book, Assman establishes a relationship between three major themes: memory (reference to the past), identity (political imagination) and cultural continuity (the formation of tradition). Such a connection offers people "a common area of experience, expectation and action which leads to

trust and orientation" (2). It brings hope and continuity by linking past experiences with the present, it creates myths and histories, that is, "adherence to the same laws and values," "the memory of a shared past" (3). Thus, we form traditions and rituals, and we have a canon.

As Assman explains, we have the term "cultural" because this kind of memory can be preserved only institutionally and artificially, and we have the term "memory" because "in relation to social communication it functions in exactly the same way as individual memory does in relation to consciousness" (32).

The author also introduces the concept of "ars memoriae" ("the art of memory") which is "the basis of artificial memory" (15), meant to help the individual, through certain techniques, to learn "an extraordinary amount of knowledge, for example, for rhetorical use" (15). If the "art of memory" refers only to the individual, the "memory culture" is the social obligation of a whole group, the answer to the question "what must we not forget?" (16).

Communication is the link between individual and group memory. Through communication, a person forms its memory and memory survives only through communication: "we only remember what we communicate and what we can locate in the frame of the collective memory" (23).

Memory functions through what Assman calls "figures of memory": "reference to time and place," "reference to the group" and "reconstructivism" (37). Memories have spatial frames: "What is remembered as home" (24). They represent "the image a group has of itself and its social function" (25), and those of them survive, that a society can reconstruct while "working within its present-day frameworks" (26). As such, "there are no pure facts of memory" (26) and history begins when "the past is no longer remembered" (26), "at the point where tradition ceases and the social memory dissolves" (30).

To sum up, the present volume will approach several of the main problems of memory—the material through which it is transmitted, what is transmitted and what is hidden in terms of history, what people decide to preserve and how we should do it—bringing new insights to an already much discussed theme. While literature will define our second volume.

This issue will close with a review to *Wrapped in the Flag of Israel. Mizrahi Single Mothers and Bureaucratic Torture* (Smadar Lavie), an enlightening combination between a coursebook, a piece of writing about life and a feminist manifesto, both an insight into Israeli intra-racism and a compelling connection between bureaucracy and torture.

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Looking at the Changes of Writing Materials in Italian Medieval Records¹

Abstract: Recently, the methodological approach that has developed regarding the double historicity of the texts, the duality—material and content—inside each of them, has allowed the overcoming of the opposition between “the pureté de l'idée et sa corruption par la matière” (Chartier).

To fully understand the meanings of texts, it is crucial to study their material aspects. The moment, the place, the writers, but also the purpose, the content, the authors and the recipients of a text profoundly affect the exterior forms of a record, starting from the choice of writing materials.

Just now, when the space of writings is becoming immaterial, it is important to consider the causes and consequences of past changes of writing surfaces and their impact on the most widespread and preserved materials. Analyzing these changes, studying their causes and effects, the quantitative and qualitative progresses of the different materials used, helps us understand memory and the present of our cultural heritage.

Keywords: Diplomacy, Paleography, Codicology, Archivistics, Cultural heritage

Introduction

I would like to start with a simple fact: a historian has to work with the documents that are available to him. But he also has to ask how much of the former amount of documents is extant, how much has been lost meanwhile and to study the proportion of the tradition of the records. One possibility to analyze the quantity and the quality of the documentary heritage and, finally, to understand the cultural and institutional memory, is to look at the changes of writing materials.

Documents do not automatically become records. Writing may be done for ephemeral purposes, without any intention of keeping the documents permanently. Instead, a document can become a record when it registers something—for example an event, a rent, a sale, a marriage, a donation—because someone wanted that event to be registered and preserved for a long time.

Medieval writing materials themselves made the scribe conscious of time. Because he was presented with different writing surfaces as a medium, he made an initial choice between the ephemeral and the permanent.

The moment, the place, the writers, but also the purpose, the content, the authors and the recipients of a text profoundly affect the exterior forms of a record, starting from the choice of writing materials. Therefore, that very document also registers the intention of using specific writing materials to convey information and preserve important memories.

The Status of the Document in Current Debates

Recently, the disciplinary and methodological debate about the double historicity of texts, especially narrative texts, about the duality—of materials and contents—inside each of them, has reduced the gap between “la pureté de l'idée et sa corruption par la matière” [the purity of the idea and its corruption by the matter] (Chartier, “Culture” 800).

¹ I would like to thank Vincenza Petrilli at the State Archive of Milan for the reading and the useful suggestions to this article.

The new approaches adopted by analytical bibliography—let us think about Donald McKenzie, Michael Clanchy and Armando Petrucci's studies on the graphic culture—have shown that to fully understand a text, it is necessary to analyze not only its content, but also its material aspects.

As Christopher Tilley argued, the study of material culture “centers on the idea of materiality as an integral dimension of culture, and indeed there are dimensions of social existence that cannot be fully understood without it” (1). Historiography is thus leaving the ideal perspective, derived from Platonic philosophy, which considers documents as entities not related to the physical context that made and preserved them. Material aspects are going to be considered as a key factor to be examined in order to define and understand texts as *res in forma* and finally appraise them and plan the best policies for their conservation.

The writing surfaces of which records have been made and the methods used to transform words into symbols appropriate to those materials, have varied considerably. Considering such aspects is crucial. Over the past two decades, as noted by Paola Carucci and Luciana Duranti's studies, the advent of digital media has dramatically changed the very idea of writing instruments, from material to immaterial ones. The widespread diffusion of digital memories and tools necessitates a study of the phenomenon and its difficulties. The conservation of the new documentary forms is a very complex function. Its main difficulty concerns the tools and types of material to be preserved, because they are objects constantly changing with regard to physical aspects, display mode, conservation and consultation. As in the past, the technology environment today has significant impact on the processes of formation and management of contemporary memory. Therefore, it is important to consider the causes and consequences of past changes of writing surfaces and their impact on the most widespread and preserved materials.

Italy: Papyrus, Parchment and Paper

Assessing the impact of the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic elements of documents represents the aim of this quick and inevitably limited examination of the different writing materials. To do this, my primary focus will be the materials used in Italy during the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Era to write down records²: papyrus, parchment and paper (for a general introduction see Giry 1972, Bresslau 1998, Agati 2003). In the end, we should be able to understand the factors that led to the transition from one writing material to another, and whether and how the choices were determined by the need to protect the memory of the documentary heritage. At the same time, my intent is to study how such choices affected the preservation of documents and, ultimately, if they still affect the survival of our documentary heritage.

Although the length of this article requires a very precise geographical scope for such survey, this is not limiting in itself. Considering the few European medieval documents kept for the period prior to the 10th century, the amount of Italian documentation is an exception: we are talking about great numbers of originals and copies (265 records) and of the oldest original record belonging to Pisa, from the year 720 (Schiapparelli 1929-33, Ghignoli 2006 and Ghignoli 2009). In the Western French area, the oldest original is 619-620, but documents are much more sparse, less numerous and for the most part in the form of copy: only 25 original records up to the 9th century (De Bouard 1948; for the edition of the documents Atsma et al. 1981-87). In the Eastern French area, except for the important but isolated corpus of documents of the St. Gall's Abbey—133 original records from the 8th to the 9th centuries (Erhart and Kleindienst 2004; for the edition of the documents Bruckner and Marichal 1954; and Bruckner and Marichal 1956)—the documentary heritage is equally sparse and in the form of copy: in fact the records, all dated from the 8th century onwards, are copied in the *libri traditionum* of Passau (Heuwieser), Mondsee

² By documents, I mean records of legal facts written down in accordance with intrinsic and extrinsic forms to confer them probative value (Paoli and Bascapé).

(Verwaltungs-ausschuss des Museums Francisco-Carolinum zu Linz), Ratisbona (Widemann), Frisinga (Bitterauf).

Analyzing the Italian documentary heritage, we see that the topic is broad and complex, showing a large variety and quantity of archaeological sources prior to the documentary ones (Ornato et al. 2001). Also, it has been studied by many scholars and historians, though they have so far focused almost exclusively on manuscript books, containing novels, hymns or poetry, both western and eastern.

The writing materials of these manuscripts have been studied mainly with regard to technical aspects, such as the different animal skins (Di Majo et al. 1985, Di Majo et al. 1988, Rück 1988, Rück 1991, Ansalone et.al. 1993), format (Gumbert 1993), manufacturing (Chahine 2001), including the places where they were made and sold (Cavaciocchi 1992) and, finally, their use (Bischoff 1993). Recently, due to new technologies and scientific knowledge, analysis on the qualitative aspects of writing materials has been undertaken, as well as studies on the techniques of restoration and conservation and survey instruments and digital reproduction have been made (Ornato et al. 2001). Illustrative examples are *Wasserzeichen des Mittelalters* through which it is possible to access Piccard-Online, Briquet-Online and *The Bernstein Project* that merges the results of several repertoires of watermarks and allows cartographic and statistics visualizations.

In Italy, the most ancient and widespread writing material is papyrus. In order to study where and how it was used, we can refer to a few works: the *Chartae Latinae Antiquiores*, the lists edited by Jan Olof Tjäder and more or less recent thematic catalogues (Dorandi 1996). The results obtained from examining these works led to two basic conclusions: in Italy, papyrus was used for writing records for a long time, from the 5th to the 10th centuries, but its spread throughout the peninsula seems limited to Ravenna, capital of the Exarchate, and Rome, at the papal chancery (Bresslau 1093-1105). While in other areas such as Piedmont, Lombardy and Tuscany parchment seems to have replaced papyrus already in the 8th century. In fact, the oldest records date back to the second decade of the 8th century and are all already written in parchment: Pisa, January, 29, 720 (Tjäder, *Chartae* XXVI 799); Milano, June, 6, 725 (Marichal, *Chartae* 845); Novara, 729 (Tjäder, *Chartae* XXVII 838).

Recent studies have demonstrated that these conclusions must be partially revised. In fact, to consider only the resources that have survived, means to exclude from the survey those areas with few resources and also those areas with less ancient records.

Our considerations about the times and places which saw the use of papyrus in Italy change considerably if we accompany the study of the originals, such as the records from Ravenna and those created by the papal chancery, with the information contained in latest records, such as those from Naples (Martin 183-189), Rome (Carbonetti 33-48), Venice (Pozza 801-848), Milan (Marini 54) and Siena (Brühl 52). In these cities, according to numerous indirect sources, writing records on papyrus went on well beyond the 7th and even the 8th centuries. This prevalence of the use of papyrus was caused by a strong attachment to tradition or, in other words, by the reluctance to change the extrinsic elements of the documents. The actual transition from papyrus to parchment was due to the awareness of the little resistance papyrus offered, plus the increasing difficulties of its supply (Carbonetti 33-48).

However, this was a very slow transition. Moreover, it was the protracted use of such a fragile writing material as papyrus, which in all likelihood caused the loss of most of the records and a transmission of the documentary memory characterized by extreme disproportion between the number of documents originally written on papyrus and their effective conservation over time (Carbonetti 33-48). If papyrus fragility and the consequent losses of records have long caused the risk of an underestimation of the use of vegetal writing surface in the Middle Ages, on the contrary, the durability of parchment has allowed a better long-term preservation of documents written on animal skins, perhaps apparently lengthening the period of its actual impact over the other writing materials, i.e. papyrus first and paper later. Also, in this case it is not easy to closely follow the transition between parchment and paper. On the one hand, the

loss of paper records dating back to the 11th and 12th centuries meant the need to postpone the introduction and the widespread use of the new material; on the other hand, administrative and indirect sources urge us to reconsider the real incidence of paper in the daily practice of writing.

In Italy, the introduction of paper began around the mid-12th century. The oldest Italian paper documents are almost coeval with the oldest reports of paper-making processing in the peninsula. During the 12th century, Catania and Palermo were the first paper manufacturing centers in Italy using the Arabic technique; while the first isolated pieces of information about paper produced according to the Western technique are dated to the following century, around the regions of Liguria and Tuscany. In a deed drawn up in Genoa, June 24, 1235, two owners of paper mills, one of which was from Lucca, employed a papermaker for their factories (Briquet, *Briquet's Opuscula* 181, Pirani 19-46). But even before this date, we know of sales of reams of paper whose production is attributable to mills operating in the area of Colle Val d' Elsa (Agati 45-120).

The introduction of paper soon caused problems in drawing up, use, storage and long-term conservation of documents. In 1145, in Sicily, King Roger ordered some documents written by his predecessors to be rewritten "de carta cuttanea in pergamenum" [to be rewritten on parchment]. The same happened in 1222, when Frederick II ordered some paper records of his predecessor William II to be transcribed on parchment "quoniam incipiebant vetustate consumi" [since the writing surface begins to get old from consumption] (Bresslau 1110). Even though these examples attest to the awareness of the fragility of paper, the oldest paper records written by a royal chancery and still preserved as originals date back to the period of Frederick II's reign (1228 and 1230) (Bresslau 1111).

This is not a contradiction: rather, considering the different purposes of the documents written on parchment from the ones written on paper, it is clear that the choice of the material requested a preliminary assessment of the type of legal transaction. In fact, in 1231, Frederick II stated that mandates and scriptures not intended for long term conservation could be recorded on paper, cheaper but also more perishable, and prescribed the use of parchment for solemn diplomas and, in general, for documents proving perpetual or long-term rights "instrumenta publica et aliae similes cautiones" [public and notarial records] (Bresslau 1111).

During the 13th century, we find similar restrictive measures marked by the preliminary assessment of the intended use, even in the common law of some Italian centers, like Padova ("Instrumentum factum in carta banbacina non valeat nec fides adhibeatur eidem" [Only the record written on paper is valid]) (Gloria 66), Como (Ceruti 59), Bergamo ("in libris vel quaternis offitii pecudinis vel membranensis nec papiri" [It is permitted to write books only on parchment, not on paper] Storti and Storch 185) and Bologna ("in bonis cartis... et non in garbittis" [Documents must not be written on poor quality paper, but on good quality paper] (Frati 147)). At the same time, even praxis reflects what is prescribed by the regulations. For example, if we analyze the oldest paper records in Lombardy, dating back to the mid-13th century, and almost coeval with the oldest records of such material in the area, we see that the earliest documents were letters, interim writings useful for the performance of legal proceedings, inventories of goods and rents necessary for the current, ordinary, administrative and financial activities of those institutions that drew them up (Mangini, "Impiego" 17 and Mangini, "Il cambiamento" 5-8). And the same happens in France, where until the end of the 13th century the use of paper is limited to "l'écrit d'administration et de gestion: correspondances et actes tels que les quittances et mandements ou les copies d'actes authentiques, registres de notaires ou de justice, comptes, registres domaniaux, fonciers" [Administration and management records : letters and acts such as receipts, orders, certified copies, records of notaries, judges, lords and officials], while parchment is intended for the "actes authentiques scellés et de tous les documents à valeur perpétuelle" [The authentic sealed records and documents with perpetual validity] (Bourlet, Bretthauer and Zerdoun Bat-Yehouda 166). They show their content and value even in the choice

of extrinsic aspects: first of all, the use of the paper surface, preferred because it was less expensive than parchment (Ganda 145), even if it was insecure in terms of duration and quality of preservation.

Therefore, practical needs favored the choice of inexpensive even if temporary writing supports, for current and internal use. They were records without *publica fides* and deliberately different, for extrinsic and intrinsic aspects, from documents written down by notaries on parchment to confirm rights of possession and perpetual enjoyment of *res*. No wonder then, that in the context of the scriptures with *publica fides*, while still in the 15th-16th centuries, parchment was destined to write the originals issued to eligible parties. While already from the middle of the 12th century, anywhere between Italy (Rovere 304) and France (Capodano 205-218), paper was intended for notarial registers, as in the cases of Genoa and Savona. In fact, the long-term preservation of these registers was ensured by notaries, required by the articles of their association to ensure memory of rights contained in the registers and even interested in their economic exploitation.

So, most of the reservations about the use of paper were related to its duration and perishability, which appeared inadequate to the legal and permanent validity of the decisions and transactions which were to be recorded. This was also the reason for the extensive and prolonged use of parchment, which was even reused for bookbinding. Just over the last years there has been an increasing interest in the study, restoration and cataloguing of fragments from bindings made with parchment sheets of dismembered manuscripts (Merlani 20-23; Scianna 33-40). Major studies, the results of specific scientific projects, have been made in the field of Jewish (Perani 127-143), liturgical-musical (Baroffio 133-140) and notarial fragments (Mangini, “Nuovi itinerari” 549-563).

However, we should not underestimate other factors of equal importance in influencing the choices of different writing surfaces. For example, in some areas of the Alps, the larger availability of parchment coming from local farms, and conversely, the distance from paper manufacturing centers have remarkably slowed the transition from parchment to paper (Mangini, “Impiego” 21).

At the end of the 13th century and the beginning of the 14th, the many different watermarks of the Italian paper documents implicitly show the proliferation of manufacturing centers. In fact, in this period, the increase of paper manufacturing facilities—around Fabriano in Marche (Castagnari 1990; 1993), near Naples, Salerno and Amalfi in Campania (Amatruda 2013), in Tuscany especially at Colle Val d' Elsa (*Carta e cartiere a Colle*), in Liguria between Voltri and Acquasanta (Briquet, “Le papiers” 29-31; Calegari 1986), and in the North-East of Italy around Lake Garda, Padua and Treviso (Mattozzi 23-65; Simoni 1995)—increased their offer, causing a lowering of the costs of production (Irigoin 62-66; Hills 73-98; Castagnari and Calegari 1990).

These factors, plus the decisive improvement of the technical qualities of the product, concurred to reduce, until almost erase, the cautious hesitation of the 13th century towards paper, whether to entrust it with official or solemn acts, legal instrumenta and literary, historical, philosophical monumenta. So, the use of paper became widespread, beyond the practice of writing down records, also to manuscripts (Montecchi 125, Ganda 146). One of the oldest paper codices written in Northern Italy, perhaps in Liguria, was made just in this period (Ferrari XVI): Manuscript 35, preserved in Fondo Galletti of the State Archive of Milan, contains “Disputatio facta inter Cotardum mercatorem lanuensem et quosdam sapientes iudeos et doctores in synagogis iudeorum” (ff. 1r-26r), “Requisitiones et argumenta facta per magistrum Samuelem israelitam oriundum de felicitate regis Machochitam ad rabbi Isach magistrum sinagoge”, better known as *Epistula rabbi Samuelis* (ff. 31r-47v), and a fragment of “Concordia Novi ac Veteris Testamenti” by Gioachino da Fiore (ff. 48r-50v) (Danelli 24-28).

The introduction and then the wide use of paper involved significant changes not only in the practices developed to write down records, but also in those to preserve documentary materials. Between the end of the 13th century and the beginning of the next, the constant increase in the thickness of paper documents created serious logistical problems. At this time, in fact, there were no appraisal processes or

planned selections of records which were judged having permanent value (Casanova 339-340). Nevertheless, it was clear that the massive use of paper had inevitably caused a significant increase in the archival complexity. In fact, several institutions began to adopt policies of decentralization of archival sources, creating separate storage locations, depending on the different frequency of consultation of the documents for the daily management of administrative practices. From the second half of the 13th century on, the archive management was a cause for concern in many municipalities. In Bologna, for example, it was already necessary, in 1254, to purchase bags *pro reponendis scripturis*. The budget for a new cupboard was then approved and finally, in 1289, it was necessary to carry less consulted documents to the palace of Biava (Romiti XVII-XXI). Similar situations and solutions occurred, for example, at Siena (Archivio di Stato di Siena), Parma (Torelli 282) and Chiavenna (Mangini, "Impiego" 19-21).

At the beginning of the 15th century, the relationship between the two writing surfaces is almost completely reversed, both in book production and in notarial records and documents of the chanceries. The demand and the supply of parchment and paper turned upside down: now parchment was a surrogate for paper, and paper became the prevalent writing material, also intended for official or solemn records, legal instrumenta and literary or scientific manuscripts.

Conclusions

Eventually, the quality and the quantity of the survival of the medieval Italian documentary heritage was largely determined by the close and mutual relationship between text and writing materials, in which the text could not exist without the writing materials, but at the same time those materials were determined by the type of the text.

Then, at a time when our documentary heritage is becoming immaterial, at a time when technology provides new and ever more powerful digital tools for writing, reading, storing and managing documents, it is crucial to study documents from the past, even in their material aspects, in their being *res in forma*. In fact, "only by preserving the understanding of our culture of the codex may we wholeheartedly realize the 'extravagant happiness' promised by the screen" (Chartier, *Forms and Meanings* 25).

From these perspectives, the writing materials of the medieval Italian records should be considered as a comprehensive source of historical information, not only for Palaeography, Diplomacy and Codicology, but also for a large range of academic disciplines related to any cultural research that still considers memory as a special and challenging object of study.

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Collective Memory in a Prosumer Society

Abstract: The paper seeks to suggest the negative effects that a prosumer culture will have on collective memory. By grounding the paper in the theoretical discussion initiated by Ritzer and Jurgenson, the paper looks at sites of memory and the participatory cultures enabled by Web 2.0. The main problem is that prosumption supplants collective memory because prosumption validates and celebrates the individual's memory. This is a troublesome theory, because as we move towards a culture that seeks freedom and the erasure of authority in the online environment, the implications as how this will undermine collective memory are daunting, especially for humanists.

Keywords: prosumption, collective memory, rhetorical tools, Web 2.0, MeMorial

Introduction

In *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression*, Derrida suggests that the archive is a seat of power, a place of commandment: "the meaning of 'archive,' its only meaning, comes to it from the Greek *arkheion*: initially a house, a domicile, an address, the residence of the superior magistrates, the archons, those who commanded" (2). Consequentially,

The citizens who thus held and signified political power were considered to possess the right to make or to represent the law. On account of their publicly recognized authority, it is at their home, in that place which is their house... that official documents are filed... They have the power to interpret the archives... The dwelling, this place where they dwell permanently, makes this institutional passage from the private to the public. (2-3)

It is from here that Derrida moves towards the development of technology, and how that changes the archive: "what is no longer archived in the same way is no longer lived in the same way. Archivable meaning is also and in advance codetermined by the structure that archives" (18). Derrida not only recognizes the power of the archive, but that the content of an archive is dependent upon the construct of the archive. I begin this paper with Derrida in an attempt to connect the idea of prosumption to its implications on the memory of a collective. Fundamentally, many who discuss prosumption tend to agree that web 2.0 culture is benefiting and improving due to prosumption; however, I suggest that the lasting effects that prosumption will have on collective memory negate those benefits.

Defining Prosumption

Prosumption, according to Ritzer and Jurgenson, is a product of capitalist economy. They believe that prosumption is not a new concept, but that "recent social changes, especially those associated with the internet and Web 2.0... have given it even greater centrality" (14). Prosumption, as the term suggests, is the idea that individuals in capitalist economies are both producers and consumers. This is an interesting concept because in a capitalist economy, the belief is that businesses produce, and the audience consumes. What Ritzer and Jurgenson point out is that during the 1960s, there was a shift in the production/consumption dichotomy. With the advent of fast-food restaurants, indoor shopping malls, and entertainment venues like Disneyland, the consumer was exposed to numerous outlets of consumption and the consumer became the producer as well. They provide the example of the self-service soda

machine and gas station pump, and the way in which the fast-food customer is no longer served by a waitress but instead has to bus his/her own table after consumption, as evidence of the emerging idea of prosumption. Currently, prosumption has moved to the web. On the web, prosumption is ubiquitous, and to a certain extent the masses who utilize the web do not even realize that they are 'prosumers'. For instance, when one purchases something from Amazon.com and is asked to "leave feedback" and does, he has become a prosumer. Furthermore, those who use Facebook are prosumers on a daily basis, yet that idea is definitely not at the forefront of their minds. They use the social networking site as a platform to share their feelings, but it is through their usage of the site that Facebook continues to operate.

Ritzer and Jurgenson argue that "digital prosumption online is the emergence of what may be a new form of capitalism" (31), which suggests that prosumption has emerged as a force that is changing our traditional views of the producer/consumer binary. They cite four ways in which this change is apparent. First, it is the waning control of capitalists on contemporary prosumers. To illustrate this point, Ritzer and Jurgenson refer to the ever-growing cyber-libertarian/digital socialist movement. They note that more than ever, "the orientation of capitalism and its goals—especially ever-increasing profits—are in conflict with cyber-libertarianism that remains a strong presence online on sites such as Wikipedia, Linux, and Creative Commons communities" (23), and it is because of this conflict that capitalists are experiencing opposition from collective and individual resistance to paying for information/services, or being asked to contribute without compensation.

Second, the concept of exploitation is no longer applicable to prosumers as it was when referencing the way in which producers and consumers were exploited. They note that, "prosumers seem to enjoy, even love, what they are doing and are willing to devote long hours to it for no pay" (21-22). Even though the potential or actual profit still belongs to the corporations, many prosumers are using sites, contributing to sites, without being compensated, and this is not considered exploitive in the traditional sense.

Third, there is a lack of "exchange of money for goods and services" in the prosumer society. This connects to the loss of control that capitalists are experiencing over the prosumers, as the new economy, which seems to be based off of the cyber-libertarian ethic, promotes open-source mentality, which in turn "provides the ideological underpinning for the development and proliferation of non-profit web-browsers, operating systems, encyclopedias, and so on" (28). No longer is the relationship between companies and consumers one that is based on money.

Finally, there is a movement away from the business model being based on limited supply. In the prosumer culture, there is rather an abundance of material. This abundance has also led to a shift away from efficiency, "instead of focusing on efficiency, this new capitalism is largely focused on the creation of effective products and services. That is, the concern is with the quality of what is produced irrespective of what it takes to produce products or services" (30). Here they cite *Wikipedia* as an example of a site where the system "of nearly infinite inputs" will ultimately lead to quality, or accuracy in this case. Obviously, these shifts suggest that prosumerism is ultimately creating a new economic system, or at least has the ability to force us to view the economic system differently. Ritzer and Jurgenson seem to suggest that prosumerism places an enormous amount of power in the hands of the prosumer, while removing power from the corporations. If one were to take a closer look at those sites that promote prosumerism, one would see that this is just an illusion. I refer to Henry Jenkins' *Convergence Culture* as evidence of this illusion. He claims that there is a circulation of media content that "depends heavily on consumers' active participation" and that "convergence represents a cultural shift as consumers are encouraged to seek out new information and make connections among dispersed media content" (3). The point he makes is that consumers are being subconsciously led to participate in activities, sites of prosumption, et cetera, by the companies themselves. He cites transmedia experiences as one example of how consumers of a particular network show, extend their experience with the show, but in doing so they become consumers of the network.

While Ritzer and Jurgenson are focused on the capitalist aspects of prosumption, Recuber is interested in how prosumption has emerged as a new form of archival creation. While both Ritzer and Jurgenson, and Recuber agree that the Web 2.0 did not invent prosumption, but rather allowed for “massive involvement in, and popularity of, many of these developments, it can be argued that it is currently both the most prevalent location of prosumption and its most important facilitator as a ‘means of prosumption’” (Ritzer and Jurgenson 20), Recuber focuses on the social, constructive aspect of prosumption. For Recuber the benefits of prosumption are not economic, nor do they deal with the liberation of knowledge/media. Instead, he focuses on how the individual can benefit from prosumption, mainly in the form of self-help. To help show that prosumption, because of the web, allows users to create sites of memory that in turn offer them platforms for therapeutic release, he examines two sites that offered users the ability to post content. He writes about these sites that they are forms “of prosumption, because the users who produce and upload content to these sites are also the consumers of the sites” (533). Furthermore, these online memorials are sites of prosumption because they remove the power/control from the few, and place it in the hands of the contributors. Like Ritzer and Jurgenson, Recuber believes that the advantages of prosumerism outweigh the disadvantages. He notes that sites of prosumerism “create new communities..., supplement face-to-face interaction; increase participation in voluntary organizations; and provide a more reflexive, open, and democratic alternative to older forms of journalism” (534). Also, he too agrees with Ritzer and Jurgenson that even though these sites do not pay their contributors, the prosumer feels pleasure from co-creation, so that whether prosumers are exploited or not, is still open for debate.

What is most interesting about Recuber’s implementation of the concept of prosumerism, is how he connects prosumerism with the online memorial. Recuber sees these sites of memorialization as places of “prosumption for collective memory” (535). He notes that:

Traditionally, memorials have been constructed at the behest of elites, to enshrine dominant points of view, and to celebrate the lives and deaths of heroic individuals. The physical construction of a memorial frequently marks a spot in the geographical landscape as meaningful and sacred, either due to the lives lost there—as at the site of a famous battle—or due simply to the ability of memorial architecture to convey a sense of sanctity and solemnity. Such memorials have the power to sustain a particular interpretation of events within collective memory at least partly because of the physical durability of the landscape to which they are attached. (535)

However, the online platforms allow for the prosumer to experience the memorial in a more interactive and participatory way, and the “internet generates a kind of ‘writable collective memory,’ which captures contemporary norms and mores about a whole host of social issues” (538). These sites collect, preserve, and display the memories of the masses, not the few, hence it is more of a collective representation of the memories associated with the event. Recuber does note many disadvantages to this type of memorialization, which I will return to later.

Prosumerism, the MEmorial, Kool-Aid, Facebook

Prosumerism has subconsciously infiltrated the interests of other theorists. First, Gregory Ulmer in his book, *Electronic Monuments*, notes that prosumerism, without calling it prosumerism, manifests itself in the MEmorial, and that this MEmorial “allows students and citizens to use the Internet as a civic sphere” (xvii). The MEmorial is how the individual internalizes an event, but then responds to that event in an attempt to produce a “new consultancy.” The prosumer provides consultation services in the wake of an event/emergency, and these sites of monumentality “become a primary site of self-knowledge both individual and collective, and hence a site supporting a new politics and ethics, as well as a new dimension of education. Electronic monumentality provides the basis for a virtual public sphere capable of producing

public policy decisions...” (xxi). The MEMorial relies on testimony, or on ‘production.’ Ulmer notes: “The purpose of a MEMorial is to witness and testify regarding the event of a public problem, to shift it from the private, individual status of one at a time, each case in isolation, to a cumulative public status of sacrifice on behalf of an unrepresented national value” (136). Because it is the individual who decides what events, topics, et cetera, need to be further addressed, the MEMorial has value that is user assigned. Finally, the MEMorial has a reciprocal nature in that these sites act as “a source for understanding contemporary values, specifically as a mode of self-knowledge, rather than attempting to impose on the disaster a predetermined meaning” (109). The MEMorialist is therefore contributing to a wider narrative, while moving beyond the simple “I feel.” The MEMorialist offers solutions to problems, he even exposes problems that the collective may not have recognized or considered, and thus the MEMorialist uses prosumerism as a way to promote self-interest, but also civics and community building. Second, Jose van Dijck, in *Mediated Memories in the Digital Age*, highlights how “media technologies and objects, far from being external instruments for ‘holding’ versions of the past, help constitute a sense of past—both in terms of our private lives and of history at large” (2). We then use these objects of mediated memories, through prosumption, to share our memories. Through sharing, van Dijck argues, we actually build communal memory:

While we are reinventing the tools for remembering, fantasies of digitized memories enter our popular culture. Technologies of self are intimately interwoven with cultural products: home movies, for instance, surface in Hollywood blockbusters, family albums become online multimedia productions, and tape collections inspire grand-scale schemes of music swapping. (51)

How these items become “online multimedia productions” is through prosumption. We use social media sites to upload our memories, and in doing so, we entice others to share in our memories. One example van Dijck provides to illustrate this point is the Lifelog. He notes that, through these online diaries, which are a mediation of the paper, lock and key diary, “teenagers not only express themselves but also create a communal sense of values and thoughts deemed worthy of sharing” (70). These prompt further prosumption, as “online posts may be read and responded to by immediate friends and relatives, and they may also invoke reciprocity from complete strangers, adding another dimension to the small world of immediate peers” (71). Finally, he notes that these “bloggers are retooling the current practice of diary writing, meanwhile creating new types of mental scripts, cultural knowledge, and social interaction with their tools. The reciprocity inherent in networked systems points at a profound reorganization in social consciousness” (75). In effect, van Dijck believes that new media, aided by prosumption, will engender new types of memory which is, in turn, beneficial to society. Despite all the positives associated with prosumption, one must consider what prosumption means for the future of collective memory, and whether some of these sites prescribed by the aforementioned theorists are actually effective and efficient vehicles for the collective memory in the digital age.

My theory about prosumption and collective memory is grounded in the potential problems that can ensue when prosumption is mixed with memorialization. To begin with, I want to address the concept of groups in terms of prosumption and collective memory, before addressing memorialization because, in the digital age, groups are both formed by and form memorials, especially digital ones. In *On Collective Memory*, Halbwachs notes that:

What makes recent memories hang together is not that they are contiguous in time: it is rather that they are part of a totality of thoughts common to a group, the group of people with whom we have a relation at this moment, or with whom we have had relation on the previous days. To recall them it is hence sufficient that we place ourselves in the perspective of this group, that we adopt its interests and follow the slant of its reflections. Exactly the same process occurs when we attempt to localize older memories, we have to

place them within a totality of memories common to other groups, groups that are narrower and more lasting... It is not because memories resemble each other that several can be called to mind at the same time. It is rather because the same group is interested in them and is able to call them to mind at the same time that they resemble each other... just as people are members of many different groups at the same time, so the memory of the same fact can be placed within many frameworks, which result from distinct collective memories. (52)

Here, it would make sense that prosumption would create such a group, such a framework that would promote collective memories; however, if we look at the potential of prosumption to remove commonality from groups, then one can conclude that memories would be eradicated. Yes, I admit that many social media sites require users to “choose their friends” and thus groups are user oriented, and thus would-be groups which Halbwachs would say would be interested in common memories. However, more and more online sites of memorialization consist of groups of people who are not connected to each other, but rather to the event at large. Though being connected to the event would suggest that memories would be in common to the group, Recuber shows through his examination of two different sites of memorialization that the memories held by these members of the group, or frameworks, are actually less unified and fragmented, rather than collective in nature. As Recuber notes, because these sites focus on therapeutic ends rather than on truly recording memories for historical significance, the sites often consist of messages that described “what it was like to experience the loss of a loved one, or commemorated aspects of a particular victim’s personality” (539), rather than messages about the event itself. The purpose of collective memory is to maintain these events, which in turn become commonplaces in our society that rhetoricians can then implement.

Furthermore, as sites of memorialization become sites of prosumption, there is a loss of authority. Though some posit that this is a benefit of prosumer society, I disagree. Not only is the concept of the monument destroyed, but the ability of the monument to record historical facts is also lost. Traditional monuments are authoritative in nature. Timothy Recuber writes that:

Traditionally, memorials have been constructed at the behest of elites, to enshrine dominant points of view, and to celebrate the lives and deaths of heroic individuals. The physical construction of a memorial frequently marks a spot in the geographical landscape as meaningful and sacred, either due to the lives lost there—as at the site of a famous battle—or due simply to the ability of memorial architecture to convey a sense of sanctity and solemnity. Such memorials have the power to sustain a particular interpretation of events within collective memory at least partly because of the physical durability of the landscape to which they are attached. (535)

Though Recuber notes the concept of the physicality of the monument and its impact on collective memory, the point that he makes about who builds these monuments and the idea that the monuments are able to immortalize “a particular interpretation of events” is what is of ‘grave import.’ The implications of this fact are clear: one monument, one perspective. However, this may not always be a bad thing. Authority usually denotes competence, knowledge, and acceptance. Authority is much more beneficial than misinformation/misrepresentation. Before a monument is erected, a committee usually presides over the purpose of the monument and the design. The discussion usually entails questions about longevity and the public reception and points of view. Though the public has little input in the planning stages of the monument, they are considered, which ultimately suggests that the public’s interaction with the monument is a major area of discussion, and the public’s interaction with the monument and the longevity of the monument are linked. Because part of the appeal of the monument is the location, visitation, or rather accessibility to and within the location is also a characteristic that must be considered when building a monument. I think that this fact speaks volumes for the illusionary belief that the web memorial offers more interaction for a wider group of individuals than the physical monument does: the

physical monument is more interested in public reception, while the web monument is not. This I believe also suggests a reinforcement of collective memory, as the event itself, and the community's interaction with the event is at the forefront of the planning stages of the monument, while it is not in the web memorial.

It is true that through the use of the virtual landscape, individuals are able to erect virtual monuments or memorials in response to events that have transpired within a community. Some of the first examples of these virtual monuments appeared after the 9/11 tragedy. As Recuber notes in his essay, "A wide variety of websites exist today that are devoted to the exercise of collective memory and the creation of memorials devoted to tragic or catastrophic events" (532). There are sites that commemorate the victims of hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the victims of shootings such as Virginia Tech and Columbine High, and of course 9/11. Recuber notes that the exigence behind many of these sites is that those who establish such sites are seeking a therapeutic effect. While the traditional monument or memorial is established as solely for didactic purposes, the virtual memorial is now more personal and hence individuals can experience a catharsis of their emotions while passing on information or perspectives of the event or person for which the virtual site has been established. Because of this, the

digital memory banks and online archives sidestep some of the political questions about the representation of disasters within collective memory. Traditionally, archives and other repositories of collective memory in physical space have had to decide what documents and artifacts were worth storing and what ones they did not have room for, as well as how to display the artifacts they did collect. These decisions were necessarily political, and frequently elicited objections. (544)

And the sites that he viewed were able to include everything that was uploaded to it. Despite the appeal of this, especially when we consider Ritzer and Jurgenson's ideas about cyber-libertarianism, a site that includes personal reactions to an event, where those reactions are mainly focused on an individual, negates the purpose of a memorial and thus removes the collective memory. As Halbwachs writes,

it is necessary to show, besides, that the collective frameworks of memory are not constructed after the fact, by the combination of individual recollections; nor are they empty forms where recollections coming from elsewhere would insert themselves. Collective frameworks are, to the contrary, precisely the instruments used by the collective memory to reconstruct an image of the past which is in accord, in each epoch, with the predominant thoughts of the society. (40)

As you can see, a memorial constructed with an individual's memories would not equate to a collective framework, and as Halbwachs posits here, without a collective framework there is no collective memory. Though I do believe that it is important to share one's experiences, one has to admit that throughout Recuber's essay, he repeatedly states that the contributions to the 9/11 digital archive do not fit the parameters of a contribution to a collective's memory. Ultimately, the experiences that are posted to this site are un-relatable to the masses, and despite the fact that these posts belong to prosumers who lost someone in the 9/11 attacks, other individuals who read these posts are not fully able to connect with the authors or with their experience, because they did not know these people, or they did not lose anyone in the attacks. Furthermore, someone who was not privy to the 9/11 event because they were either not born, or the event happened when they were too young to comprehend what was taking place, would not truly understand the severity of the situation if all the posts they read focused on commemorating a person rather than an event. Part of the appeal of collective memory is that the event is internalized by the members of the collective, and can be passed on to new members. I suggest that one recognize that this site is not an ample framework for collective memory. Frameworks enable individuals to work with the memory: to locate oneself through it, to retrieve it, to share it, to build upon it. As it is, this site of

memory cannot fully facilitate that, because it lies in the realm of subjectivity and not collectivity. To further illustrate my point, I will point towards Rebecca Moore's essay, "Drinking the Kool-Aid: The Cultural Transformation of a Tragedy." In this essay, she seeks to explain how the expression "drinking the Kool-Aid" has been transformed through cultural amnesia. She notes that for many the referent for this idiom, the Jonestown tragedy, has long disappeared, which is an example of cultural amnesia. Moore writes: "according to Mieke Bal, cultural memory signifies that memory can be understood as a cultural phenomenon as well as an individual or social one" (94). I do not ignore the insertion of the word individual; however, one must not ignore the rest of the argument either. It is logical to suggest that the 9/11 digital archive, as a site of prosumption, is an ineffective vehicle for collective memory because the site does not allow for the memory of 9/11 to be fully understood on a social level, due to the extremely subjective nature of the content of the post. In addition to posts, among the pictures that are included in the archive are pictures of those who died as a result of 9/11. These photographs were added to this site by various relatives of the deceased. Once again, photographs of specific people, photographs that do not contain images of 9/11, as some of these photographs of the deceased were taken before 9/11, are also dissociated from the actual event and therefore do not fully embody the memory of 9/11. I propose that because virtual memorial sites allow for such levels of subjectivity, that the reference point, which is 9/11, will soon be lost for future generations. Using Moore's Kool-Aid example, this would be an example of dissociative amnesia, as the photographs and the subjective story are not explicitly tied to the actual crashing of the planes into the World Trade Center buildings. Among the characteristics which are considered when building a monument is the monument's ability to promote the memory of the event, not necessarily of those who were affected by it, or the effect it produced, but the event itself. This is an important idea to consider because as time progresses, more and more individuals will be further removed from the event. Virtual monuments, if the links to such sites remain in operation, will be available for as long as the internet is available, however, will the memory of the event be relevant?

Stavros Kammass sees mobile technology as the next wave of documenting cultural heritage. He writes:

we have seen that memory is not just remembering the past but it is strongly connected with physical artefacts, places and social interaction. Memory, for example, can be contained in objects, buildings, images, sounds, tastes, smells, narrations, texts. Since the challenge about memorizing an absent past is the reproduction of it, a solution would be the reconstruction through the valid combination of various artefact types that would create a collective nostalgia through a grounding process. (9-10)

He believes the mobile technology that supports the grounding process is the key to maintaining memory. He suggests that social networking is necessary to facilitate and disseminate cultural memory because it "is a result of social interaction" (10). I agree with this statement. However, as many have witnessed first-hand, social interaction through social networking sites like Facebook, has actually promoted individualized memories instead of collective ones. More than that, even Facebook is a platform that is being used to promote reactions to events, rather than a place to record the actual events, or sequence of events. Facebook is yet another site of prosumption that is clearly ineffective as a vehicle of collective memory, because it supplants the collective in lieu of the individual. As society moves towards a prosumer culture, it seems that the concept of collective memory is being replaced by that of individual/personal cultural memory.

Conclusions

Van Dijck defines "personal cultural memory" as "the acts and products of remembering, in which individuals engage to make sense of their lives in relation to the lives of others and to their surroundings, situating themselves in time and place" (6). This is nothing to dismiss, and I see the importance of personal

cultural memory. However, collective memory is important for more than just a community's ability to remember the events that have shaped their lives. Collective memory is an important teaching and rhetorical tool. As I have argued elsewhere, collective memories are like commonplaces, and commonplaces infuse argument. Without access to collective memory, it is a logical step to suggest that rhetors and teachers alike will have little to draw upon when trying to assist with explanation of ideas and concepts. This may seem like a huge leap, not to mention very pessimistic; however, as a teacher I have seen it firsthand. What does seem like the most efficient vehicle of collective memory, and one positive implication of the Web 2.0 prosumer culture for collective memory is Ulmer's MEmorial. The way in which the MEmorial uses rhetoric and electronic composition to promote public problem solving, is the best example of how prosumption can indeed utilize collective memory, create a framework for it, and then promote it. Its rhizomatic nature allows for readers to enter the MEmorial from multiple angles, while maintaining the collective identity: "the terms (monument, archive ...) apply to the collective as well as to the individual versions: the citizens find their missing chapter precisely in the collective, extant, external records of the civilization" (Ulmer 14). The manner in which the MEmorial can act as a framework for collective memory, through using it as a mode of invention, while maintaining it and allowing for prosumption, is the silver lining.

Yes, much of this was speculative, as there is really no evidence to refute or support my assertions that prosumerism is harming the future of collective memory, but I think that there are logical conclusions that can be drawn from existing material that has been published by the theorists I have mentioned here. From what I can ascertain, collective memory is continuously being supplanted by individual memory and a logical deduction to make is that as a result of this, collective memory will wane. What I believe needs to happen, is that composition and rhetoric courses need to begin to shift the focus of the course to one that implements collective memory as tool of invention.

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A Meeting Place between the Individual and the Collective: The Cultural Memory

Abstract: A remembrance can be oral, written or visual and reflects the behavior of memory, which proceeds by associations, in “leaps and bounds,” remembering what it wants to remember. If memory becomes a “documented culture” or a culture “organized in a social memory,” then individual memory becomes historical and shared, it becomes a strong element of the identity in which it was imprisoned and evokes the memory of all those who lived the same historical period. If individual memory is important in order to live the present, collective memory is just as important, because it strengthens the sense of belonging and reawakens the past. In the current study, the meaning of being the same age and the significance of “generational” remembrance will be explored. Modern technologies provide great ways to remember, because they rekindle old memories and make us appreciate past events of our life. Perhaps the most widespread technology is television, which in Italy has proved to be a useful means to create and maintain national identity. Individual memory adds to collective memory and individuals trust their memories and the past that they remember, even if history has been rewritten several times. However, the effort goes towards finding common points rather than diverging ones and the past in which we believe is the same in which others also believe. Thus, shared memory is confirmed as an important element of collective and cultural identity.

Keywords: documented culture, social memory, generational, technology, identity

Introduction

Ancient Greek had two words to designate memory: *mnémè* or memory—“a recollection comes to my mind,” and *anamnesis*—“I am looking for a recollection.” The relationship between pathos and memory and the practice of searching for it leads us to “history,” which is a search engine, as it does not have the *mnémè*, the time of recognition. While memory has its own emphasis, that is, the vivid and recognized recall, history constructs *ad infinitum*, in the hope to construct in a definite way. “Memory can be reached through different routes (...), it even divides: in one direction we have the word *ars* and in the other the word *vis*” (A. Assmann 27). The former means “art of memory” and “*vis*” is understood as *ingenita virtus*, included within the three main faculties of the human spirit: imagination, reason and memory (A. Assmann 27). Etymology connects us to a language and to a philology, which, developing over time, can be seen as the rigorous method of memory that finds in the “central theme of the language” (etymology) the way to enlighten the hidden content of the archetypes that do not belong to any written history (A. Assmann 33).

The human mind needs to remember and in order to do that it needs contents that have to be conscious, vivid, evocative, full of information and implications. Ricoeur (133-136) maintains that remembering is radically personal; it is a link of consciousness with the past and gives the timeline from past to future. Memory can provide all that without the need for remembrance to be “technically” precise. In other words, it is enough for remembrance to meet the function for which the mind recalled it in that moment (Cornoldi and de Beni 9). Among the diverse types, the autobiographical memory has the function of recognizing one’s own personal identity. Without memories, we would be nobody because we would know nothing of ourselves. The function of that kind of memory is in fact to organize knowledge and, to do that, it uses a very important organizational key, which concerns the time dimensions of autobiographical memories. Through recall, people know they have acquired a certain piece of knowledge

before another, or at a certain time of their life, and such knowledge is invested with a positive connotation. However, not-so-personal autobiographical memories do exist, as do personal memories that are not so autobiographical.

Research on individual memory has revealed that there are times of life in which more memories are found, the so-called “reminiscence peaks.” The presence of such peaks can change from person to person, and the richness of the memories depends also on how significant were the times in which the events recalled took place. Furthermore, these peaks most often concern positive memories, while less characteristic trends have been found for negative memories.

In contrasting or comparing individual memory to collective memory, it becomes necessary to talk about “generation.” The concept already exists in the classic sociological theory: Mannheim, in fact, maintains that albeit “it was constructed by individuals born in a certain period of time, it is already a collective identity based on shared memory. A generation can actually be seen as an age cohort that takes on a social meaning by presenting itself as a ‘cultural identity’” (243, see also Arnoldi 52-56).

Generational Memory

In the present study, we aim to discuss how collective memory is formed, starting from the generational memory: the main difference between the two types consists in the mode of remembrance. The former actually remembers through the “preservation” of messages (writing, film, television programmes, voice on tape), while the generational memory refers to life experiences and may include literature, music and technologies as well, but it is mostly based on the experiences lived by the individual. The collective memory represents the organization of the documented memory. The individual and generational remembering may be intersubjective, but also merely shared. In this manner, a social memory comes into being, because in the interaction between the individual and the collective, the final word belongs to the social group. Collective memory does not overlap historical memory, which remains a heritage of the social memory that turns into cultural memory.

Therefore, this study analyzes the relation between individual memory and society and the particularities of the new generations which have a local (national) dimension and a universalizing one (Baby Boom, X Generation, Echo Boomers).

Age is a factor of important competition with the previous generations.³ Time is rooted in a horizontal identity (due to the period shared with contemporaries) both with the generations of the past and the generations of the future that the present generation lives with.⁴ As already said, a generation is an “age cohort that takes on a social meaning establishing itself as a cultural identity” (Edmunds and Turner 62). When we talk about generations, we get into the merit of human cohabitation in its deepest aspects: the notion of generation can be used as an inner unit of measure, which can be experienced only *a posteriori* because those that are part of it are aware of it only in retrospect. “Using the ‘generation’ category as a time measure allows measurement through an *a posteriori* experience of spiritual movements” (Mannheim 247), enabling one to explore the question of contemporariness that happens when (and it is the most frequent option of all) at the same chronological time different generations live together, each

³ When we talk of generations, we refer to individuals joined together by a life cycle: their individualities share the same historical period, with the same special boundaries, specific characteristics, and overlapping. “These cohorts find themselves included in the family, in the school, in the media, which underline the differences and the generational rebellions by allotting a special identity” (Colombo 14).

⁴ Vast research has been carried out on how long generations last: it seems that the 25-year generation will not satisfy all measures. Assmann and Frevet (37) mentions 40 years and 3 generations; others (Colombo 50-51) point to male generations being longer, on average, than female generations. They also maintain that both are longer than the 25-year interval that has always been used as a rule: the male generation is at least one third longer; the female generation at least one sixth longer.

with its own historical and biographical experience. In such a case, there is the non-contemporariness of the contemporary (Arnoldi 33-35). It is natural that every individual lives with other individuals of different ages, younger, older, and contemporary. However, "for each person the same time is another time, that is to say, another era for himself, which he shares with his contemporaries" (Pinder 21). This is because the positioning in terms of generation is based on the biological rhythm of human existence. Belonging to the same generation links individuals in a kindred way within the historical development of the cultural process, and so the year of birth becomes extremely important.

Each cohort establishes its own rules and practices, and the ways these dimensions are implemented interact with memories, with culture and with everything that articulates the natural mutation of their contents and of their relationship given by the succession of generations. The members of a generation recreate the narration of their remembering in a compliant way, which is called the "cohort effect." The sharpness of recall depends on how close in time the events are or also on the attitude a person has towards their past. Many can be the reasons for thinking that several life episodes can have a high value of remembrance because of their uniqueness, their personal involvement, their emotional importance, and the crucial place they hold in the organization of personal knowledge. There are generation boundaries, actual invisible walls that separate the youngest ones from the rest of the world.

"When a certain substratum of shared knowledge is lost, the communication between epochs and generations breaks down" (J. Assmann 13). It may seem a loss, but it is a necessary happening, because ties become distant and often the criticism of the older generations on the younger generations concerns above all their "knowing very little," their "being ignorant." However, the latter "ignorant" generations will say the same about the generations that will come after them.

Collective Memory

If memory becomes a "documented culture" (Crane 31) or a culture "organized into a social memory" (Braga 40-43), then individual memory takes on the role of historical and shared memory, thus becoming a strong element of the identity in which it was imprisoned. It then expands as if through communicating vessels, allowing the memory of individuals that have lived the same historical period to re-emerge. The social or collective memory begins with the conservation of messages, through the graphic note of verbal messages (writing), which was the first conservative-transmittable form of the common language. But we have now achieved sophisticated systems of digital recording, which can be found in all forms of channelization (from sound to visual).

Indeed, the work would remain "neutral" if there were no reading of it or, in any case, its use, which is the "activation" that gives it life every time. If a text is read or a film is watched, that text and that film will remain intact and each user will have before them the same artefact. However, this does not imply that the meaning is purely subjective, as the very existence of alternatives requires a meaning to be justifiable and therefore intersubjectively accessible (Iser 246). This level, where social memory becomes "organized culture," is a store of everything "which is made by man" and it occurs with the shift from oral memory, as described by Ong (243), to memory based on documents, a shift which took dozens and dozens of centuries. The importance of social or collective memory is that it is external to our mind and in order to access it all we need to know are the codes (e.g., alphabet, music notation, numerical code) or the programmes and the advanced instruments useful to activate the technological supports (using a computer, optical devices, digital TV). In the oral world, the word was limited, as was also its recall, whereas a text can have an endless number of readers and therefore of interactions.

Thomas and Znaniecki (533) observe that, as concrete social life is concrete only when it is considered together with the individual life that underlies social events, social consciousness must not stay on the surface of the social flow, but rather reach the attitudes and the human experiences that make up the full social reality. Special analysis is devoted to the nature of memory, that is to say, whether it can be defined

as individual or intersubjective. Ricoeur supports the reciprocal simultaneous constitution of personal and social memory (170). Two main concepts have been developed by Halbwachs: “social framework” and “social memory” (34-37). With “social framework,” the scholar meant memory itself as a set of notions that can be recalled at any time the person wishes, but also external collective reference points. The “social framework” is a form of stereotyped social memory: the judgement that lies behind individual memory changes over time, trailing the flow of the most widespread social judgements.

Collective memory is connected with the social effects of an event. And until such effects continue, a social group will hardly be able to forget a certain event. For instance, a war can mark the collective memory of future generations even after it has come to an end; for example, a person cannot forget the death of a dear one in that war. However, it is a “prolonging” of social memory, which depends also on the social importance given to the collective memory of the conflict. In this sense, individual collective memory “looks” while social memory “sees.” We could also say “sees to” in the sense that society perpetuates our individual memories into collective ones.

In social memory, too, there is the “past,” “present” and “future” triad, transformed by Ricoeur into “own,” “close” and “far” (28). The dialectics of the three-time dimensions is the “historical consciousness,” which, by using Koselleck’s (123-134) terminology, amounts to a polarity between the “space of experience” and the “horizon of expectation.” In this way, history connects with memory, exploits its capacity of detachment, and in turn exerts a critical function on it by operating on the search for documents, on the historical explanation and, lastly, on making up the wide historical portraits that narrate an era (Ricoeur 92).

Cultural memory is the “monumental” principle of culture, which needs an interaction between spatial and time conditions to be allowed to accumulate and become collective heritage. Among the commitments of the collective memory scholar, there is also the observation of the transformation of individual memories along the history axis, as a mirror of the generational change. In other words, personal memories “do not exist only in a particular social stratum, but also within a specific time line. Such a time line is defined through the generational change” (Assmann and Frevert 37). If the generational change takes place about every forty years, special historical times that imply a traumatic event—such as World War II—witness a compression of the experience of three generations in the years that usually involve only one. The threat of *oblivion*, moreover, is always an existing possibility, because it can be deleted, hidden, deviated or silenced in order to stop ideas from circulating and establishing themselves (Rossi 25).

Collective memory is characterized by the fact that the members of a certain group can share a number of past representations that were communicated to them in socially determined and culturally regulated ways. Candau (85-97) defined some criteria to establish the existence of collective memory: directly or not directly witnessing an event; the onset and spreading of doubts on the interpretation of the event within the group; the size of the group. For these reasons, collective memory does not overlap historical memory, which is broader and more stable than the former, even if it is subject to various kinds of reinterpretations. The specificity of historical memory is that it remains as the heritage of social memory and takes its place on level of documented culture, independently of the individuals or groups that activate it, thus becoming cultural memory.

Halbwachs’s statement that “it is only within society and from society that individuals acquire their memories, remember them, or establish them” implies that collective memory is an overarching structure that goes beyond individual recollection and encompasses a complex range of meanings, memories and images. As they belong to different generations, groups participate in and give rise to a given historical period, sharing the memory of some of the events that occurred: and so, among the members a displacement continues to exist which depends on several causes, due to both the individual and the distribution of information within society.

Collective memory within a group is given by the development of the members and of past events, in which it can be recognized, through all the successive changes, so much so that one can say that collective memory lives with change, as it leads to the emergence of similar experiences, which keep on changing (Ferrarotti 107).

Memory between the Individual and the Society

Not all forms of memory participate in the same way in the exchange between the individual and society: some are too tied to experiences lived as *interna* (too personal and emotional), while others are lived as *externa* and only partially activated, like for example social memory.

Should we have to list the types of memory, certainly the main ones would be historical, social, collective, generational and individual memory. The first two are the most restrictive, even if they are in any case tri-dimensional, that is, they encompass present, past and future. The past concerns the typical events of the generation, those that make a generation remembered because of them; the present means being together in recalling, that is, sharing memories with those that participate in the definition of a certain generational identity (in these people there is always a connection given by “do you remember when...?”, “at that time it was possible to...”). As regards the future, there is the wish never to forget what one was and to differentiate oneself from other generations.

Historical memory and social memory form the cultural wealth of every community (and also of humankind) on which one draws to find one’s own identity, the national identity for instance, but which is generally cultural (A. Assmann 51).

Collective memory has a wider range of action than generational memory and its tri-dimensionality is brought about by the past (which belongs to everybody but especially to those that have lived through it), the present, which is near (close) and is lived at the same time but, as we will see, “differently” by those that experience it (different interpretations), and lastly by the future, a dimension that is still far off because the experience of life and its practices are here and now (*hic et nunc*), in the daily routine that encompasses also the memory of the past.

If one goes in depth into generational memory, it can be seen that it is shaped in the early years (the first 20) and that it remains as such, because everything that happens later will be included in the collective memory shared by all the generations living within the society of that time. Not all the historical “layers” are present in generational memory, because the most “present” one is the we-generation, which takes up the particular space that goes from the moment a generation becomes aware of itself, that is, towards the end of the time “allotted” to it by society, and stops when “the new”—in other words, the younger generation—begins to advance. An example can be some cartoons broadcast on TV or reproduced on CDs: at a certain point they are replaced by new cartoons or maybe a few decades later there will be a revival of an “old” cartoon, which in any case will be enjoyed in a different way by the new generations, because the context will be different as will the users’ daily experience. The same can be said of music in general and in particular of the disco music for 20-year-olds who, at a certain point, will find it changed: it is no longer their music and they no longer find themselves at ease in a discotheque. The same happens for clothing, for which the change is felt in the transition from pre-adolescence to adolescence (brands and styles that are now liked are no longer those of the pre-adolescent years. On the contrary, one wonders “How on earth could I wear those things?”). Observing these—sometimes drastic—changes, we can get a cross section of what a generation does and of how much being born at the same time causes unity, because it is the historical, cultural and social period that makes possible equality, identification, belonging to the same generation, and, what is most important, sharing. Generations are lived in the present, but are understood when they are over, that is, when we place them between brackets and distance ourselves from the historical period that has produced them; then and only then can we identify them. One may wonder to what extent generational memories can be collective. There is “cultivation” for generational

memory and cultivation for collective memory, which have some points in common. It must be underlined that generational memories have a strong basis in “localism,” although they may include some sort of international “knowledge.” In Italy, the songs about those that went to fight in the Vietnam War did not directly concern the Italian youths, but what was important was that those who went to war were young people “my age.” In the US, remembering this historical event was a very different thing that personally involved that generation.

In the same nation, a generation may also not be identified with the year of birth. In Italy, when we mention the “*Boys of '99*” (1899), we mean the young boys that turned 18 in 1917 when they were called up to replace the many soldiers lost by the Italian Army in the battle of Caporetto. However, a man born in 1899 who had not fought in the War was not a “boy of '99.” There can be other reasons, too. At the beginning of the last century, the Treaty of Versailles—which ended World War I—granted Italy the territory of South Tyrol, formerly part of Austria. When in the 1960s all the ex-servicemen of World War I were granted a small pension and the medal of “*Cavaliere di Vittorio Veneto*” with the War Cross, the South Tyrolese that had fought alongside Austria were given the pension but not the title of *Cavaliere* (Knight), which identified a whole large generation recognized *a posteriori* and made up of those Italians that had fought in World War I.

In the United States such situations have recurred at every war since World War II. This shows that specific historical events affect the identity of large groups of people by defining them in the remembrance of difficult and sometimes painful life experiences. When historical events become social and collective memory, they are both world and national events, and nationality is very important because the world includes different peoples living in different nations and with different cultures. Above all, there is no “global” man, but rather individuals that connect with others: generation is a collective noun; it exists because there are others that have shared a significant experience “with me.”

Other denominations that have been acknowledged in many parts of the world were “the 1968 Movement,” a social and political movement started at Berkeley in 1964 (it also had an interethnic aspect in the US) that protested against the *status quo* and spread to Europe and even to Japan. Also to be considered are revivals, thematic TVs, such as those that broadcast the most important historical events or anniversaries, as happened in 2009 with the celebrations for the 40 years since Woodstock and the landing on the Moon. In such cases collective identities gain strength again, are remembered and re-interpreted also by the cohort that encompassed them in their younger years, but they are experienced as a “historical events,” due to a particular cultural offer, also by individuals in other phases of their life.

A New Definition of ‘Generation’

The examples given above show that a generation is made up of “doing” and “belonging”: going to war, protesting, belonging to a group that shares something more than one instrument, than one event deemed important. For example, going to the gym does not shape a “generation”; those who use the bicycle are not a generation of bicycle riders. Colombo (18) observes that when the radio was invented and started to become popular, nobody ever thought of calling the youths that had a radio the “Radio Generation,” not even when the pocket radio or the television became widespread. The TV generation (or “TV children”) was mentioned when the first generation of children was born after the television had become popular to underline the difference in fruition, the same that can be said for the *Digital Natives*.

It is important to take offer into account because nowadays generations are almost exclusively defined by the name of the technologies they use. After World War II, generations were called: “*Baby Boomers*,” “*Generation X*” (X signifies the lack of a defined identity), followed by “*Generation Y*” defined also as *Millennials* or *Echo Boomers*, which includes those youths that became of age in the early years of 2000. If sociology considers the generation first of all as identity and history sees it as subjectivity, marketing sees the generation as a target, in other words a social segment that can adopt coherent and

homogeneous consumerist behaviors. In defining a generation, one can resort to a single consumption trait, linked to the use of technological novelties (*Net Generation*, *Nintendo Generation*, *Digital Natives*). Such definitions, however, are a misrepresentation of the generation as we have understood it so far.

However, if offer takes first place, it must be recognized that in the present society there exists a trend both to simplify the cultural offer through stereotypification, thus satisfying a wider section of the public, and to differentiate the public. The most evident process of the production and the commercialization of cultural products is the hyper-segmentation of types of life and styles of life. Paradoxically, we can witness the tendency, springing from globalization, to differentiate and individualize with the favor of technology. Such a proliferation is contrasted by particular audiences who have a very restricted range of interests and who need a high degree of artistic and ideological stereotypification, as shown by TV programmes and fiction. The continuous fragmentation of the so-called “peripheral” culture indicates that the content of programmes is “tailored” in an increasingly refined fashion in order to match the life styles of specific social groups. There are no incentives to innovation, which would involve the risk either to look for new audiences or to be dropped in the selection process that becomes a choice in multistages (Crane 101). “This means that all cultural artefacts distributed by small marginal organizations can hardly go beyond the first stage and often are not even taken into consideration. Generally speaking, globalized culture tends to confirm rather than challenge the most accepted worldview” (Tessarolo 168).

Ultimately, it is the culture of the media and not the high culture that sets the standards, thus shaping popular taste. Such culture does not cancel social differences and does not set up new groups; instead, it creates what Goffman (26) defined as “aggregates,” who have typical styles of behavior and tastes that lack the identity process, with the exception of limited groups such as the fans (Tessarolo 166-175).

Conclusions

It is taken for granted that the members of a community share memories. But it is a simplistic way of thinking to try and understand how memory operates in the present of communities, leading to a transformation of the past into meaningful “social frameworks” that organize individual remembrance into collective memory.

The sense of belonging is the way identity finds its roots in time, in space and in relationships when it meets “the others,” the group and the community. In order to reconstruct collective memory, it is not enough to simply put together the individual memories of the group members who remember different aspects of the same event. Such a reconstruction must take place based on notions that each group member shares and reciprocally exchanges with the others.

Perceptual awareness of memory is set within a frame that makes up the structure and the “scaffolding” of social action and that frame can be compared to the “social framework.” The memory of events is articulated by the group through a process achieved by accepting a specific viewpoint on a given event and accepting the meaning it has for the observer. The way groups and individuals participate in the social life, allowing the past to surface in the present, is expressed in the keying process (Migliorati 61). The past is a narrated commemorative memory that allows us to distinguish what is significant from what is not. Behind collective memory, there is no collective soul or objective spirit, but rather the society with its symbols: through shared symbols the individual participates in a common memory and in a common identity. Transmitted in space and time, social symbols make up an abstract community, because its members need not know one another to recognize their common identity.

Long believed a typically individual faculty, memory has a deeply social and collective nature: our memories are memories also shared by many other people, by our own group, or by our generation. And so, a person’s memory is always strongly affected by his/her background. There is no individual or

collective identity that does not rest on memory, understood both as interpretation of the past and as propensity to a future reality, whether desired or dreaded.

Remembrance is intermittent and overlaps other remembrances; it blends with the differences of the various spatial images. It is subject to reflexivity and thus the members of the same generation not only have something in common, but they also share the awareness that they have something in common (Corsten 262-267).

Collective memories are a powerful means of cohesion. It is not only the memories that stabilize the group, but also the group that stabilizes the memories. Collective memories and the groups to which they are linked exist only in the plural, whereas the historical memory that frames all the different stories exists only in the singular.

Memory is the red thread of our existence; it is the binding agent that allows a unitary reading of ourselves and of our past; it is a reservoir of shared individual memories that have their roots in the social memory. Emancipation is one of the strong traits of a generation: at each subsequent generation—coinciding with the demise of the previous ones—there is the chance to get rid of the restraints imposed until then. It is only seemingly a generational conflict between parents and children. Actually, it is a social change because what was good for their parents is no longer so for the children, who have to cope with new challenges.

Any type of remembrance reflects the behavior of memory proceeding by associations, proceeding “in leaps and bounds,” remembering “what it wants to remember.” The time of remembrance follows its own temporal conscience which envelops the present in the density of the past linked to non-comparable and unrepeatable life experiences (Crespi 58).

The effort of remembering individually combines with that of remembering collectively and also with not forgetting in order to preserve gained knowledge. To hang on to memories, we have devised a number of tools that can help us with this purpose. Yet, in the course of the millennia, forgetting has continued to be a little bit simpler and less expensive than remembering (Mayer-Schönberger 41). Individuals trust their memories and the past that they remembered, although “history” has been rewritten several times. Effort is placed on finding common rather than diverging points. The past in which we believe is the same in which others also believe, and shared memory is thus confirmed as an important element of collective identity.

In conclusion, we can say that many are the points in common—and also the divergences—between individual and collective memory. However, the core of the matter is that, to the individual, remembrance is a personal experience that can be recalled at any time and of which, however, he/she has also a collective external reference: it is not exactly “my” remembrance, but a plaque, or a list of names reminiscent of an event.

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In the Indelible Footprints of Truth: Writing Narrative History, Finding Historical Narrative

Abstract: This paper analyzes varying methodological approaches to the transference of both testimony and artifact in constructing written history. It follows two contemporary texts, each of which attempts to accurately and sympathetically portray the lives of specific Jewish families in the periods prior to and during the Second World War. The fundamental question of the paper has to do with determining the degree to which an author/historian may emplot himself/herself or his/her subjective voice into an explication of historical events, while maintaining fidelity to those events. In Hayden White's terms, this constitutes "the fiction of factual representation," that is, "the extent to which the discourse of the historian and that of the imaginative writer overlap." Only by contrasting texts that operate differently—a mostly traditional historical approach set against a modern narrative approach—can we develop a vocabulary for tracking memory and postmemory transference. This paper, configured as a comparative textual analysis, shows that a delicate balance between objective data and subjective insight is the only viable way to extract clarity from what we understand as collective memory.

Keywords: postmemory, emplotment, memoir, narrative history, Second World War

Motto: "The first duty of a biographer... is to plod, without looking to right or left, in the indelible footprints of truth" (Virginia Woolf, *Orlando*).

Introduction

At the outset of a long study into his family history, Edmund de Waal does not expect to like Charles Ephrussi—his great uncle and perhaps most famous forebear—because, as de Waal notes, Charles is "much, much too rich for his own good" (35). Charles, a dandy, a sportsman, and a collector, embodies the epitome of inherited wealth, and is a flagrant bourgeois. Living in fin-de-siècle Paris, Charles can afford to cherry-pick from avant-garde culture, and sets stakes in literature, music, and art. The prizes he collects are not just aesthetic in value but also reflect a language of status: coming from a long dynasty of upper class Eastern European Jews, Charles and his family are nevertheless outsiders when they arrive in France, and intend to make every possible effort at integrating with the Parisian social elite. Beyond commerce, cultural innovation will drive them to that end.

In establishing the parameters of his history, de Waal is acutely aware of both the nearsightedness and general bias present in this outlook, and yet makes no apology. The reason for this, we are given to understand, is the necessary degree that his personal and familial histories interweave at the core of his study, *The Hare with the Amber Eyes*. For his purposes, de Waal acts not only as a historian writing biography, but also as a participant in the narrative discovery of that history. To the extent that he recounts for the reader this process of discovery alongside the method by which he synthesizes and assembles the information he uncovers, de Waal divests himself of the historian's traditional *raison d'être*, as arbiter of a factual record.

The question of emplotment is crucial for understanding this approach of narrative within history and history within narrative. Where, exactly, does de Waal himself figure into the story? To begin, in distancing

himself from the historian's function, de Waal instead distinguishes himself primarily as a storyteller, interested in the "sensuous, sinuous intertwining of things with memories" (17). In this way, de Waal aligns himself with a narrative style that historian and literary critic Hayden White refers to as pantextual (*Pluralism* 226). For de Waal, as for White, the approach to history must be broadly inclusive of multiple realms of thought. That is, "for the pantextualist, any representation of history has to be considered a *construction* of language, thought, and imagination rather than a *report* of... historical events themselves" (White, *Pluralism* 226). No formal training or purely academic methodology can uncover the types of truths that interest de Waal, and so he begins his narrative by embedding himself at its core, as an "engaged spectator" by which to synthesize its connected parts (Ricoeur 259). Simply, and without pretext, de Waal moves himself to action: to "go and find out" his family's history (17).

If we consider biographical and autobiographical writing as genres of history, what constitutes their limits? In contrast to de Waal's circumvention of purely factual reporting, it is useful to consider the ways in which traditional, scholarly historians construct a similar account of history. In *Life and Loss in the Shadow of the Holocaust*, Rebecca Boehling and Uta Larkey set out to chronicle, through such available sources as postcards, letters, and photographs, the lives of members of the extended German-Jewish Kaufmann-Steinberg family through the early part of the 20th century (2, 9). Because the source material available to Boehling and Larkey is personal in nature, written without the intent of exposing historical truths, the historians must devote attention to issues of accuracy and fidelity. Letters to a parent, they explain, may work to hide or obscure certain details that would be related with more honesty to a sibling or friend (156). To this end, Boehling and Larkey intend not only to "find the right balance in the relationship between the subject and context"—that is, between these people and the time in which they live—, but also to "deconstruct the subjective mythology" inherent in the Kaufmann-Steinberg source material (6).

As with de Waal's text, identifying the narrative emplotment of *Life and Loss in the Shadow of the Holocaust* is a useful place to begin an analysis. Such a critical application reveals that Boehling and Larkey, with a keen eye towards traditional historicity, implant themselves as an authoritative feature of the text: the reader is asked to completely trust not just their methodology, but also their actual representation of events. Boehling and Larkey's source material (primarily letters and photographs) are consistently put forward alongside secondary sources in order to "ground the narrative," and to imbue their subjects, when appropriate, with the agency of a personal voice (8). In this, Boehling and Larkey achieve support built on the following twofold effect: a demonstration of fidelity to their historical data, while equally maintaining compassion for their subjects. Even still, the historians employ the technique of narrative discourse—storytelling—to join those supports together. With this in mind, we may begin to track certain instances that are, if not anachronistic, at least in line with what Hayden White identifies as the "middle voice" (*Limits* 48). Aside from its linguistic application, the middle voice concept applies to written history in moments when the historian "is presumed to be interior to the action" (White, *Limits* 48). That is, the constructed narrative begins to involve author and subject operating on the same plane. In the case of *Life and Loss*, although Boehling and Larkey do not attempt to place themselves within the narrative proper, they do take liberties with its frame by implying an almost personal, rather than historical, familiarity with their subjects—almost as if they too were members of the extended family in dialogue.

Unlike de Waal, Boehling and Larkey's process is not one of imminent discovery; instead, they assert from the outset that a literal history is already present within their source material and the task of their research is simply to pull out the data and synthesize it for the reader, by "interpreting and analyzing how the external events surrounding the individual family members affected their personal life decisions" (9). Even so, in the process of constructing their source material into narrative, the historians often permit themselves subjective flourishes, effectively migrating away from the aforementioned mandate. Although

their narrative voice may not function quite as de Waal's, there is nevertheless a considerable subjectivity emplotted at the core of *Life and Loss*.

Boehling and Larkey's discourse figures, first, through subjective assessments of various photographs depicting members of the family, such as one set with Henny and Selma, the two sisters who serve as the family's joint matriarchs. Boehling and Larkey describe the sisters in these photos, taken throughout the 1930s and during a time of particular unrest in their lives, as looking "much older than their years" (53). In their descriptions, the historians prefer a literary to literal technique, and utilize the philosophic-literary trope of Spinoza's *affect*: simply, that the sisters' outward appearance had, by the 1930s, grown to reflect the strife endured in their personal lives to a quantifiable degree. In another photograph of a slightly later period, the historians again offer their interpretation of Selma's appearance, this time calling it "pensive" (151), again perfectly in line with a general mood they have just described, even though such a descriptor is unverifiable by its very nature. Notably, neither of these photographs is included for review, although many other photographs are provided in the text. The reader, then, must rely not only on the historians' accounting of the visual elements, but likewise their subjective interpretation of the photographs' content.

Although literary interpretations of family photographs may constitute a step outside the historian's traditional realm, Boehling and Larkey apply this subjectivity consciously, in order to enforce a tone they believe present in their other source material. If we imagine that Boehling and Larkey, at the time of writing their history, had access to the same selection of photographs the family possessed in the 1930s, we can conclude their value to be fundamentally different than other source material such as the letters sent among members of the family, and the diaries kept by some individuals. Whereas diaries and letters are written towards a certain purpose, or with the goal of a specific explication, photographs as artifact possess no inherent meaning, and lay outside the realm of their subjects' input. Photography, for this reason, can offer exceptional comparative insight.

In Marianne Hirsch's study of postmemory, photography is an important mode for understanding historic events, especially because photographs can be faithfully transmitted inter-generationally without losing fidelity. Although memory fades, and even written accounts may prove inaccurate or false, no aspect of the content of a photograph is ephemeral—indeed, it retains an immediacy unlike other materials. More specifically, "photography's promise to offer an access to the event itself, and its easy assumption of iconic and symbolic power, makes it a uniquely powerful medium for the transmission of events that remain unimaginable" (Hirsch 107-8). Although the photographs employed by Boehling and Larkey are of a largely domestic nature—they certainly do not depict unimaginable events in the way Hirsch means—they are nevertheless charged with meaning in contrast to the events they frame within the text. Evidence of this can be found among the most visceral accounts presented in *Life and Loss*, such as a section on Kristallnacht entitled "The November Pogrom... and its Consequences for Kurt and his Family" (Boehling and Larkey 108). The title of this section is important because it is placed directly opposite a photograph of Kurt and his family dated 1933, five years before Kristallnacht. In this photograph the well-dressed group of men and women pose jovially, hands on hips, smiling widely to the camera. Despite the group's apparent contentedness, the juxtaposition of this photograph against the adjoining chapter title evokes for the reader a sense of the tragedy Kurt and his family will soon endure. The photograph necessarily takes on the qualities of a reading it does not itself possess.

For their storytelling function, and as they relate as artifacts of postmemory, Boehling and Larkey contextualize the photographs through their own subjective interpretation. For de Waal, however, photographs transcend mere artifact and become an early key in his narrative discovery. As a precursor to his expansive research, de Waal describes a visit to the home of his uncle Iggy, born a Viennese Jew in 1906 and by the 1990s residing in Tokyo. Beyond wishing to respect his uncle's privacy and personal space (he intends neither to profit from, nor overtly publicize his uncle's history), he also hopes not to disturb Iggy's process of recollection. Rather than trying to interview him, collect facts, or become his uncle's

“amanuensis,” all of which de Waal finds both “formal and inappropriate” (6), he is prepared to accept Iggy’s version of events, unfolding as they do in Iggy’s own words, as a crucial part of the history itself. And with that, again, de Waal admonishes the historian’s mandate of objective exposition in favor of emplotting himself within the history’s narrative. The stories Iggy offers de Waal, along with de Waal’s act of receiving them, become equally important.

Again, we usefully adopt Hayden White’s idea of the middle voice: a particular method of history writing wherein “the subject is constituted as immediately contemporary with the writing” (*Limits* 49). Figured in this way, and further restricted by his personal sense of decorum, de Waal is limited to discreet observations. In his description of certain photographs, for example, found in his uncle’s apartment, it is important that we notice not just their content, but so too the method, and even the sequence, in which de Waal observes them, in order to understand their significance. Further, whereas Boehling and Larkey may apply any of a selection of photographs in support of their narrative, de Waal must rely on the memory of a single instance of glimpsing his uncle’s snapshots. For de Waal, an important encounter with first hand evidence is both fleeting and transitory, as through the crack in a partially opened door:

And through the door in Iggy’s apartment on his desk there was a photograph of them together in a boat on the Inland Sea, a mountain of pines behind them, dappled sunshine on the water... Jiro, so good-looking with his hair slicked back, has an arm over Iggy’s shoulder. And another picture... on a cruise ship somewhere off Hawaii, in evening dress, arm in arm. (8)

Here a literary trope, “arm in arm,” completes the narrative sequence to gain a particular emotive effect (8).

By the time Boehling and Larkey have access to the Kaufmann-Steinberg photographs, they are no longer just relics in Marianne Steinberg’s “old family photograph albums,” and instead constitute “embodied experience in the process of transmission” (Boehling and Larkey 1, Hirsch 111). Considered in this way, they fit well into Marianne Hirsch’s understanding of postmemory. But for Hirsch’s idea of postmemory transmission to be effective, the photographs available to the historian must be fully unencumbered of the generation that produced them. In historian Paul Ricoeur’s words: “To be received, a testimony must be appropriated, that is, divested as much as possible of the absolute foreignness that horror engenders. This drastic condition is not satisfied in the case of survivor’s testimonies... the witness himself had no distance on the events; he was a “participant,” without being the agent, the actor; he was their victim” (176).

As long as Marianne Steinberg is in possession of her family photographs, they are hinged on her personal testimony. Only in the hands of the historians can they be fully expressed. In *The Hare with the Amber Eyes*, de Waal complicates this idea of postmemory. Since his uncle Iggy has selected which photographs appear on his desk, he has censored the pool of memory available for de Waal’s discovery: like with Iggy’s storytelling, de Waal can only observe. In this case, postmemory and firsthand memory cannot be sufficiently disentangled. Although greatly profitable for Boehling and Larkey, photographs prove a dead-end for de Waal’s narrative quest.

II

In order to understand the tools used to assemble *The Hare with the Amber Eyes*, it is necessary to dismantle not only how de Waal portrays significant family events, but also his reasons for including them. Since he sets a precedent for reading his narrative as both subjective memoir and objective history, we do not object to following de Waal as he freely leans, whenever necessary, into either realm. Matched against stories and photographs, de Waal next traces location, “set[ting] off to find Charles” in Paris, the first place the Ephrussi family settle after leaving Odessa (21). De Waal describes the Ephrussi family, eventually one

of the most powerful and influential families of late-19th-century Paris—Jewish or otherwise—upon their arrival, as feeling an urgent pressure to conform to bourgeois standards. They immediately work towards this end by mastering the French language, since “with languages, you can move from one social situation to another. With languages, you are at home anywhere” (44). Thus established, the family, and Charles Ephrussi especially, easily slip into Parisian culture. Since for members of a rich Jewish family in 19th-century Paris it was “contrary to social practice to be seen to work,” Charles instead invests his time and money into contemporary salon culture (72).

It is in the midst of this culture of gatherings and soirées that Charles first comes into contact with Marcel Proust. As a child, we gather, de Waal was exposed to this piece of family lore as a fragment: Proust had apparently based part of the characterization of Charles Swann from his magnum opus *In Search of Lost Time* after Charles Ephrussi. De Waal, however, unsatisfied with the simplicity of this account, tasks himself with determining exactly where Charles Swann and Charles Ephrussi intersect (120). Cautious of “losing [Charles] into Proust studies,” de Waal envisions the first meeting between these men (121). Armed with “an early essay” written by Proust, de Waal skims the literary record, half inventing and half interpreting the following scene: “Proust notices Charles. There is a hubbub and he moves closer through the throng of writers and socialites. Charles is there in a corner talking to a portrait painter, their heads bowed and conversing so softly and intensely that, though he hovers nearby, Proust cannot overhear even a scintilla of their conversation” (40, 54).

De Waal’s conclusion is foregone: no doubt Proust has become enamored of Charles and must know him better. De Waal has overwritten the threadbare family mythology in favor of his own narrative, and has unequivocally—perhaps ahistorically—concluded that Charles Swann is Charles Ephrussi and no one else: “when I encounter Swann [in Proust’s writing] he is funny and charming, but he has a quality of reserve... That is my Charles” (122).

In addition to salon life, de Waal takes note of Charles’s penchant for collecting, an equally important project for assimilation into this “glittering Parisian world” (123). In an effort to prepare himself “for a life in public,” Charles creates “his own burgundy-and-gold *mise en scène* in his Parisian bedroom” (50). More to the point, Charles becomes a collector in general of art and artifact, eventually raising a “collection of forty Impressionist works” including examples from Manet and Renoir both of whom, as with Proust, he comes to befriend personally (89). In terms of artifact, Charles, drawn to the late 19th century French craze for *Japonisme*, purchases a “complete and spectacular collection” of Japanese netsuke—miniature hand-carved statuettes (65, 77). Both because of their uniqueness, and because they are one of the few items of Ephrussi’s wealth to survive the Second World War, de Waal devotes the rest of his narrative, in essence, to following the netsuke from Charles in Paris to his own great grandparents in Vienna, to their son Iggy, and finally into his own possession in present day London. This constitutes a striking shift in narrative approach. Along with de Waal’s research and personal experience, he permits the netsuke, as “things with memories” (17), to bear witness, and in this, they construct a new version of postmemory transference.

From Paris, de Waal tracks the netsuke as they travel as a gift from Charles to the home of his own great grandparents in Vienna. These Ephrussi, like their Parisian kin, while quiet proponents of maintaining their Jewish identity, are much more interested in aligning themselves above all else, with the “secular and new” (126). In Vienna in 1899, the essential way to abide by this new secular approach fell under the idea of *Bildung*: assimilation by means of “culture, knowledge, [and] the journey towards experience” (145). For narrative purposes, de Waal adopts his family’s model, likewise seeking “the journey towards experience” (145). He visits the Palais Ephrussi on Vienna’s Ringstrasse, and faithfully traces the daily and often mundane lives of his Viennese forbears, cautiously anticipating the devastating changes imminent to their routine. As his great grandparents embed further into Austrian life, and his grandmother and her siblings grow up as Austrian Jews, de Waal begins to hint towards the moment already present in his

reader's mind: Jewish persecutions and growing anti-Semitism, the German annexation of Austria, and the onset of the Second World War (285).

When he reaches this point his technique again shifts. Despite a crucial emplotment in its narrative structure thus far, to address this extremely difficult historical period, de Waal attempts to gain distance from personal testimony and instead retreats to conveying strictly verifiable data, what he calls "safe academic territory" (79). Like Boehling and Larkey's general approach, de Waal now entrusts the recorded events of history to direct his narrative, backing every detail with objective data. But de Waal has already severed his ties with theory and methodology, and we note in his unfamiliar adhesion to the historic record a palpable anxiety. His goal is to eliminate interpretation from the troubling account of his family's exodus from Vienna, but the tone of his narrative has already precluded this undertaking. What he means to tell us is that, forced from their home and their assets seized, the Ephrussis attempt fleeing to England, and his great grandmother Emmy dies en route. But in recounting this piece of history, de Waal reflexively re-enables his conscious voice: he wonders "whether it was too much for Emmy... that the one place in her life in which she had been completely free had become another trap" (266). The transference of this memory from the event to the narrative necessarily evokes in de Waal an emotional reflection. Safe academic territory proves an impossible maneuver.

Of singular importance in de Waal's process is his discovery of a manuscript written by his grandmother Elizabeth depicting this period in her life. De Waal asserts that the manuscript is not only unpublished but also "unpublishable" because "the rawness of its emotion makes for uncomfortable reading" (293-4). Elizabeth's novel, itself largely a memoir veiled thinly by slight changes to names and occupations, nevertheless remains consistent with more important details. De Waal offers only a brief sample of the manuscript, and only as much as might be required to demonstrate that its protagonist assuredly represents his grandmother—the rest is left undisclosed. Precisely due to its rawness of emotion, de Waal keeps the manuscript safely outside of his text. For de Waal, while his grandmother's manuscript is not suitable for publication in whole, it remains significant in his story for the emotive qualities it conveys. Primarily, it is of use to de Waal because it "helps [him] understand how she felt," which he prefers to then emplot with his own distinct voice (305).

De Waal's approach, to distance or keep secret the most personal, the most graphic and visceral details, and represent them only distantly, through subjective summary, indicates the main difference between *The Hare with the Amber Eyes* and *Life and Loss in the Shadow of the Holocaust*. In the latter text, Boehling and Larkey concern themselves with a representation of events as honest and close to their source material as possible. To this end, when portraying the personal and visceral details of the Kaufmann-Steinberg family history, Boehling and Larkey defer to the family's own account, and reproduce their words directly. In so doing, they acknowledge the difficulty inherent in defining the limits of representation, and avoid what Saul Friedlander identifies as an extreme folly: the moment a reader of history can sense that "some interpretation or representation is wrong" (*Limits* 4). Boehling and Larkey sidestep this problem, and imbue the family with direct historical agency.

A significant example of Boehling and Larkey's deferral to the source material comes as the result of a particular tension between the three siblings, Kurt, Lotti, and Marianne. At the point where the narrative introduces this argument, all three siblings have fled Germany leaving their mother and aunt behind, and can only communicate with each other by post. Although it is made clear that each sibling to some extent blames the others for their mother's desperate position left alone in Germany, Boehling and Larkey eschew their typical discursive approach, and instead favor reproducing the sibling's letters as faithfully as possible, limiting their own role for this part of the text to simple contextualization. Although the nature of these documents, personal as they are, seems to naturally preclude commentary, it is worth remembering that Boehling and Larkey have no obligation to respect this. In fact, in their role as historians, they would not be at fault for instituting both contextualization and interpretation equally. And so here a demonstration

of restraint poses a contradiction in terms. While it may be compassionate to their subjects, it is also less edifying to the reader of history.

Other moments, equally visceral in nature, demand the historians' input. For example, following his release from the Buchenwald concentration camp, Boehling and Larkey report that Kurt was unable to "bring himself to describe his time [there] to his family, presumably because it was too painful to relive the horror and fear he experienced... but also probably because he did not wish to traumatize them" (*Life* 129). In pointing to the absence of Kurt's own voice, Boehling and Larkey defend their use of peripheral details and their second-hand interpretation of his experience at Buchenwald; there is, after all, nothing more available to them. Unlike de Waal's grandmother Elizabeth, whose manuscript of her emotive state after the war is intentionally suppressed by the narrator-de Waal-for his own sake, Kurt has made the inverse decision, and removed his voice from a discussion of Buchenwald entirely, specifically enabling Boehling and Larkey, for the sake of historical inquiry, to speak on his behalf.

III

Conclusions

In *Swann's Way*, Proust burdens Charles Swann with an unrelenting, irrevocable love for Odette. At one point Swann teeters on the border between reclaiming his "intellectual and social interests," all of which he has sacrificed for Odette, and fully succumbing to his desire for her, which assumes for him "a sort of reality superior to that of concrete things" (335). Although de Waal points to no historical equivalent for Odette in the life of Charles Ephrussi, their relationship as described in *Swann's Way* is nevertheless of some value in considering the ways in which Charles—both Swann and Ephrussi—are handled by their respective narrators. Proust describes Swann as "himself" only "in thrall to another" (339). Within the narrative, we can take this to mean that Swann only exists subordinately, first to Odette, but ultimately to Proust as author. In this same vein, and in consideration of the same narrative effect, the Ephrussi family only exists in *The Hare with the Amber Eyes* in thrall to their heir, Edmund de Waal.

No similar precept exists in *Life and Loss in the Shadow of the Holocaust*. In this text, Rebecca Boehling and Uta Larkey use primary source documents—letters, photographs, and diaries—in order to support their general narrative. There are moments, in addition, importantly the most graphic and visceral parts of the history, where the historians imbue the Kaufmann-Steinberg family with direct historical agency and allow their letters and diaries to speak directly. In contrast with de Waal, Boehling and Larkey make every effort to avoid aesthetic influence, and disenthral, as far as possible, the Kaufmann-Steinbergs from the narrative voice required of history writing, reserving it only to add context or join fragments.

In *The Hare with the Amber Eyes*, Edmund de Waal neither wishes to purport literal accuracy, nor be judged on the merits of his historical fidelity. De Waal's process, less constrained than a historian's approach, records both history and memoir in tandem. To this end, de Waal's process can be described again in Hayden White's terms, as "the fiction of factual representation," that is, "the extent to which the discourse of the historian and that of the imaginative writer overlap" (*Fictions* 22). Whereas de Waal embeds himself in the history he studies, Boehling and Larkey intentionally address their subjects from a distance, because they believe, in line with Marianne Hirsch's notion of postmemory, that this method produces greater clarity. No matter their investment with historical fidelity however, both texts are fundamentally emplotted with narrative voice, and as such, both constitute a kind of collective memory. Rather than impose any limitation, this form serves each text with a wider vocabulary for addressing both history and narrative—rather than a purely academic study or a purely aesthetic embellishment, it permits both realms to function inclusively, if not strictly "in the indelible footprints of truth," then at least towards those which approach truth.

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The British⁵ Interregnum: A Yesterday that Never Happened

Abstract: Three hundred years before George Orwell wrote his 1949 novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (edition 1984), 17th century events referred to as the ‘Interregnum,’ could have served as one source for his inspiration. Several themes run through Orwell’s musings, and one pertains to the compilation of a dictionary scheduled for publication by the year 2050. The purpose of Orwell’s lexicon is to document the finality of a process achieved through ‘extirpation by redaction.’ By intentionally reversing common definitions of specific words, and then interjecting those alternative renditions into common usage, they eventually lose their original meanings, and those words can then be removed from the dictionary. Orwell explained that it is part of a process to control human memory: “You are unable to remember⁶ real events and you persuade yourself that you remember other events which never happened” (212). Today, each time the word ‘Interregnum’ is substituted for events which took place between the years 1649 to 1660, the process of ‘extirpation by redaction’ is being employed.

Keywords: Interregnum; Orwell; Cromwell; Lilburne; Charles II.

Introduction

During April 1946, in a lonely farmhouse on the bleak outer Scottish island of Jura,⁷ George Orwell commenced work on a novel containing several themes which collectively became known as *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1984). One theme or ‘thread’ pertains to the compilation of a new dictionary scheduled for completion by the year 2050 (NEF 48). Its purpose is to document by publication, the finality of a process which has achieved ‘extirpation by redaction.’ By means of intentionally reversing common definitions of targeted words, and then interjecting those corrupted definitions into common usage, they eventually lose their original meaning. Once that occurs, those words can be removed from the dictionary, while new words that describe the corrupted rendition, can be supplemented in their place. Orwell explained that it is all part of a process to control human memory so that: “You are unable to remember⁸ real events and you persuade yourself that you remember other events which never happened (NEF 212).” Three hundred years before Orwell wrote his novel, the *raison d’être* behind his dictionary had already been invented in order to obliterate real events that took place between the years of 1649 and 1660 on the island of Great Britain.

⁵ This is a geographical reference to the British Isles where the main events described herein, took place.

⁶ In Orwell’s novel he uses the word ‘remember’ over 100 times; ‘memory’ 47 times; ‘memories’ 15 times; ‘recall’ 11 times

⁷ A Scottish island located in the Inner Hebrides and off the northwest coast of the main island of Great Britain.

⁸ See note 2

A Clanton Conundrum

If cultural memory is one of many ways to remember the past, then what is a life lived, if it is based upon distorted recollections of past events? How much of a false cultural memory can be incorporated into a single life lived, before a corrupted cultural memory seriously distorts the past to the point where it is safe to say that the life lived was a living lie, because the past, as remembered, never happened.

Judgments made today, which are based upon such distorted recollections of yesterday, merely add to the mass-distortion of cultural memory that will be recalled by other lives tomorrow. When cultural decisions made today require the addition of foundational legal precedent, a conundrum is created. The past so-called, then becomes a phantasmal illusory mental image which has been conjured-up by words and pictures, rather than by a truly recalled transcribed memory reflecting an actual event which once occurred in the space of time and place.

Cultural memories are layered, one on top of another, generation after generation. Today's corrupted precedents merely add to the distortion of tomorrow's recalled record of unreality. It is in our mind that we could recall that 'swamp-pop' nasal recording of Jimmy Clanton as he describes his own cultural nightmare: "Just a dream, just a dream, all our plans and our all schemes, how could think you'd be mine, the lies I'd tell myself each time" ("Jimmy Clanton Lyrics—Just a Dream").

Immortal Memory

The mournful lyrics of Clanton's ballad tell of attempts to drown-out thoughts regarding an impossible relationship, along with counter-thoughts suggesting impractical romanticism. Orwell's sub-plot involving the creation of a dictionary is about redacting words so that they cannot be used to establish a true account of the past. The word 'Interregnum,' when applied to actual events that took place in the British Isles between the years 1649 to 1660, creates a spurious alternative romantic account of monarchical lives lived, and it was invented to support a manipulative political agenda which resonates into political lives lived, today. When used in this context, the word 'Interregnum' might be better suited to the title of a novel, or even to the lyrics of a pop song in which "any resemblance to real persons, living or dead is purely coincidental."⁹

If lives lived are rooted in the oxymoron of 'corrupted factuality,' then it is no wonder that life on this Planet seems to be a game of chance where nothing is certain, because nothing can ever be certain concerning all of the events of today which are in turn based upon events that took place yesterday. As individuals, we are limited in our first-hand observations, and what we perceive may not be a true interpretation of an actual event. Distortions abound when we as individuals have to rely upon the recall of others, if their observations are preserved in the written word (NEF 214).¹⁰ In a legal setting, even first-hand observations are not necessarily reliable guides to what a person may think they have just observed.¹¹ However, the laws which govern society today are all rooted in past precedents which have all been "written down" (NEF 214).¹² Therefore, it is well to recall Emerson's observations about the past: "All history becomes subjective; in other words, there is properly no history; only biography" ("History"). But if history is biography, then history is really the corrupted collective record of faux lives lived.

⁹ Standard legal disclaimer as used in novels.

¹⁰ *Nineteen Eighty-Four*: p.214: "Does the past exist concretely, in space? Is there somewhere or other a place, a world of solid objects, where the past is still happening?" (Italics added.)

¹¹ See: *Res Gestae—The Whole Thing that Happened*. Margaret L. Ross and James P. Chalmers, "Hearsay." *Walker and Walker: the Law of Evidence in Scotland*, 3rd Edition. *Practical Law* 8.5.1

<http://uk.practicallaw.com/books/9781845921651/chapter8> (accessed 15 November, 2014).

¹² *Nineteen Eighty-Four*: p.214: "...where does the past exist, if at all?" asked O'Brien, to which Winston replied: "In records. It is written down" (Italics added).

If we, as individuals, continually attempt to reassert our own individuality by referring back to our own corrupted cultural memories, then we as individuals are lost before we start: because we are looking for memories born within corrupted cultural files. We again recall Orwell's words: "You are unable to remember real events and you persuade yourself that you remember other events which never happened." That Orwellian scenario also depicts one of the basic flaws built into *Wikipedia*, because its policy controllers forbid the entry of what they call 'original research' and, therefore, *Wikipedia* relies upon information which has already been widely disseminated. But if that existing information is in error because it has been drawn from corrupted sources, it reinforces the caveat that anyone undertaking serious research should not rely upon *Wikipedia*, and yet it is surprising how many official sources currently link to *Wikipedia* as their source of information (see "What's Wrong with Wikipedia?").

Corrupted Memory Recall

In court cases human memory is known to be a most unreliable source of information (see Engelhardt 25-30); yet a hysterical wave of human memory recall is now being fostered in the United Kingdom to send individuals to prison on the basis of memory recall.¹³ Even when eye-witnesses to an event have reduced their observed experience to writing, they have subjected that redaction to Orwell's mantra that: "Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past" (*NEF* 34). While "a camera may not lie,"¹⁴ its human operator can selectively record some images while not capturing others, and thus distort the representation of a past event perceived by viewers at a later time.

Almost as soon as it became possible to make copies of documents, enforced licensing by governing bodies formed the foundation for institutionalized censorship,¹⁵ and by content expurgation, overseers controlled all potential influence those documents might have on the public at large. Sometimes complete works were removed from general circulation, but quite often redacted versions containing intentionally corrupted information were also put into wide circulation (see Gilder and Hagger 39-62). In many instances, with the passage of time, the propaganda value emitted by such corrupted texts has become the accepted version of particular events, because they have drowned out all pointers to the existence of alternative renditions. To make matters worse, the chief proponents of mass learning—mass-redaction and mass-propaganda—have often been religious organizations masquerading as the official voice of the source of all that exists, or will ever exist. They thereby impose nonsense by means of fear, in a similar manner to the scenario described in Orwell's 'Room 101' (*NEF* 243).

¹³ Primarily due to the efforts of Mark Williams-Thomas, a student-lecturer at (UK) Birmingham University, the name of deceased UK radio and TV personality Jimmy Saville has become a rallying call for 'sex-crime' investigations which have resulted in lurid headlines and prison sentences for a number of well-known individuals. These alleged offences stretch back into the 1950s and they are all based upon memory-recall by alleged victims who appeared in court decades after the claimed events occurred. See: Mark Williams-Thomas webpage

<http://www.bcu.ac.uk/social-sciences/criminology/employability/mark-williams-thomas>

and: Jane Mathews, "Operation Yewtree investigating 12 new suspects including police officers and politicians" *Express Online*, October 5, 2014 –

<http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/519115/Operation-Yewtree-12-new-suspects-police-officers-politicians>

(accessed 15 November 2014).

¹⁴ An interesting essay on this subject is available at: Photographic Fictions, "The Camera Does Not Lie." *The American Museum of Photography*

<http://www.photographymuseum.com/phofictionsreading.html> (accessed 15 November 2014).

¹⁵ Historical overview of book censorship.

<http://viking.coe.uh.edu/~wmasterson/cuin7337/history.htm> (accessed 15 November 2014).

The Vanishing Act

Three hundred years before Orwell wrote his seminal work, an interlocking series of civil wars took place on the British Isles archipelago. On the main island of Great Britain between the years 1649 and 1660, a republican form of government was introduced, but its official memory was later expunged by employing the highly subjective and suggestive label of 'Interregnum.' This closed cultural laboratory by 'time-branding' has resulted in the implantation of an alternative, but bogus chronology, wherein the reign of one monarch has immediately followed another. Both of them were named Charles, and the second was the son of the first.

However, the execution of the first king Charles was followed by a unitary republic, and not by his son reigning as Charles II over his father's two kingdoms.¹⁶ In 1660, that intervening republic was terminated, and King Charles II began two new monarchies,¹⁷ since the original monarchies reigned over by his father had terminated with his execution in 1649. During the creation period of those two new monarchies of King Charles II, his henchmen¹⁸ manufactured a *faux* timeline by making it illegal to refer to past events.¹⁹

When Samuel Pepys was a 15-year-old schoolboy, he was present at the execution of Charles I. Eleven years later Pepys was desperate that his youthful desire to obliterate the king's memory should itself be forgotten. Fortunately, he had not only chance, but the law, on his side. Forgetting was officially sanctioned: the Act of Indemnity and Oblivion banned "any name or names, or other words of reproach tending to revive the memory of late differences or the occasions thereof" (Norbrook 1).

While *The Official Website of the British Monarchy* of today acknowledges that there was no seamless continuation connecting the reigns of Charles I and Charles II, it does misleadingly call the intervening years an 'Interregnum.'²⁰

Clearly, there is no scientific evidence to show that human beings have the ability to roll back time. In this instance, however, it is as if Chapter One is followed by Chapter Three, while pretending that Chapter Two had never been written. Therefore, according to this alternative scenario, Chapter Three is really Chapter Two. It is a truly proto-Orwellian concept. It is also a current concept, because in 2014 it could be

¹⁶ Separate kingdoms of England and Scotland having a shared king.

¹⁷ Same as note 12

¹⁸ Although the implication is that the king is also the institution of the Crown, this is obviously not the case. Here the word 'crown' has two meanings: 1. a type of hat; 2. institutions managed by a variety of people sheltering under the name of a collective umbrella. While there is a little more transparency in their actions today, the record of individual administrators has been one of political infighting gaining enough power to unseat one king and install another to their liking. It is generally conceded that without the military masterminding of Major-General George Monck, the creation of the new monarchies established in the name of King Charles II could not have been accomplished, although: "*Centuries later, historians cannot agree on whether or not the restoration of the Stuarts was Monck's intention...*" (Don Jordan and Michael Walsh, *The King's Revenge*. London: Abacus, 2013. 129.—Italics added)

¹⁹ "Forgetting was officially sanctioned: the Act of Indemnity and Oblivion banned 'any name or names, or other words of reproach tending to revive the memory of the late differences or the occasions thereof' (David Norbrook, "Introduction: Acts of Oblivion and Republican Speech-acts." *Writing the English Republic: Poetry, Rhetoric and Politics, 1627-1660*).

http://assets.cambridge.org/052178/5693/excerpt/0521785693_excerpt.pdf;

"Charles II, 1660: An Act of Free and General Pardon Indemnity and Oblivion: 'XXIV. Persons, within Three Years, Using Any Words Tending to Revive the Memory of the Late Differences...'

<http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=47259>

(accessed 15 November 2014).

²⁰ See 'The official website of the British Monarchy' at:

<http://www.royal.gov.uk/historyofthemonarchy/kingsandqueensoftheunitedkingdom/thestuarts/charlesi.asp>

imagined that executives at Google were performing as a 1955 Presley tribute act²¹, when they told European officials that “forgetting isn’t easy.”²²

In the real world of 1649, England became a republic, and then, three years later, Scotland began to be folded into that same unified nation.²³ But in 1660, that singular republic vanished from the legislative books, and depending upon their geographical locations, its inhabitants became subjects of one of the two new kingdoms which were created to take its place. Inhabitants were forbidden by law to even mention the existence of that unified republic,²⁴ or to discuss the act of legal magic which pretended that in 1660, the monarch who now reigned over both of these new kingdoms, had begun his reign back in 1649. The truth of the matter is that in 1649, one king had been executed, and both of the separate kingdoms over which he had ruled came to a cessation. There was no ‘Interregnum.’

“Sing Tantarara, Rogues All...”

The idea of intentionally removing information from public scrutiny is not a new one (Gilder and Hagger 39-62), but in this instance it served the purpose of obliterating legal precedent. This aspect of tampering with collective cultural memory is actually the result of a legal fiction derived from the ability to exercise *nunc pro tunc*²⁵ in a most dishonest manner. By removing one document and substituting another, and then by pretending that the document substituted contains the same information as the document removed, *sans* inconsequential typographical-style errors, the past can be made to vanish within the twinkling of mischievous eyes.

While Thomas Jefferson was not above interpreting past events to suit his own needs, the mocking lament he once recited in a letter to a fellow believer comes to mind: *What a conspiracy this, between Church and State! Sing Tantarara, rogues all, rogues all, sing Tantarara, rogues all!*²⁶ Silently resonating into the 2014 Referendum in Scotland was this mocking regale of Jefferson, because, according to the

²¹ I Forgot to Remember To Forget, Elvis Presley at

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HaqjSCx_3uw

²² See: Google says ‘forgetting’ isn’t easy, as requests mount: After Europe’s ‘right to be forgotten’ ruling, the technology giant claims requests are so many, it is proving difficult to follow. *The Telegraph* (1 August 2014).

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/11005027/Google-says-forgetting-isnt-easy-as-requests-mount.html>

(accessed 15 November 2014).

²³ The process of assimilating Scotland with England into a unitary republic was gradual and in April 1654 this procedure resulted in ‘An Ordinance for uniting Scotland into one Commonwealth with England.’ See: April 1654: An Ordinance for uniting Scotland into one Commonwealth with England. *British History Online*. <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=56540>

(accessed 15 November, 2014).

²⁴ See note 15

²⁵ A Latin term meaning *now for then* which in the USA has been retroactively employed in legal practice to substitute one record for another. One such example is substituting an adopted child’s original birth certificate with a document that replaces birth name(s) with adopted name(s), but retaining other details. Another example is in the revival of a business corporation wherein the name of the original founding owner is substituted for a new owner who has bought the shell corporation as a result of a bankruptcy. In both instances the actual historical record on file can be legally changed to reflect manufactured events that never happened, and only a court order can unseal the original document, which requires knowledge that the existing document is not a true historical reflection of the original events that took place. Co-author Mervyn Hagger has personal family experience of the first example, and cites the Texas legal history of the jingle company known as ‘PAMS,’ as a second example of *nunc pro tunc* document substitutions for other than typographical errors.

²⁶ Letter of reply dated June 3, 1824 to Major John Cartwright.

<http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomas-jefferson/jefl278.php>

(accessed 15 November 2014).

standardized political parlance of today, the period of time now known as the 'Interregnum' began on January 30, 1649 with the execution of King Charles I of England, Scotland and sundry other places²⁷. It ended on May 8, 1660 with a proclamation that King Charles II had seamlessly stepped into his father's shoes at the very moment his father died. That product of *nunc pro tunc* laid the foundation for yet another work of legal fiction with the proclaimed union of 1707, which merged the Kingdom of England and the Kingdom of Scotland, into a joint Kingdom of Great Britain. It was from that Kingdom which many in Scotland wanted to secede in 2014 as a result of a referendum.

However, back in 1651, just before Scotland joined England in the creation of a united republic, the same King Charles II, who in 1660 became the separate King of England and King of Scotland, had already been crowned in Scotland as 'King of Great Britain.'²⁸ The problem with that ceremony was and is that the Kingdom of Great Britain did not come into existence until the year 1707. That was when the bogus Kingdom of England and the equally bogus Kingdom of Scotland, both of which were created in 1660 with Charles II as their shared but individual monarchs, formed the Kingdom of Great Britain after the separate Parliament at Edinburgh was folded into a single Parliament at Westminster.²⁹ In order to deal with this glitch in the thread of the historical timeline, many records falsely claim that the son of King Charles I was actually crowned "King of Scots," which of course, he was not.³⁰ He was falsely crowned 'King of Great Britain.'

Independence: From What?

On July 4, 1776, which was a mere 69 years after the creation of the Kingdom of Great Britain in 1707, 13 colonies united in a North American confederacy³¹ and it became known as the 'United States of America' ("Primary Documents in American History"). This confederacy of colonies issued their own unilateral divorce decree from the Kingdom of Great Britain, and they called their act of disconnection a 'Declaration of Independence.'

Those former British colonies replaced the institution of the British Crown with an undefined 'Supreme Creator,' although this source of their ultimate authority was further specified as being 'Nature's God,' author of 'Nature's Laws.' As we shall see, it was by referring to this Higher Power that these confederated former colonies overcame the legal fiction that Jefferson later drew attention to in his letter to Major Cartwright.³² While a Supreme Creator was immediately declared to be the ultimate source of all authority in the confederated United States of America, when the USA became a federal nation in 1789, its founding laws were set forth in a written constitution which named 'The People' as its authors. However, 'The People' retained in their laws this same unspecified deity as their ultimate source for of all that exists.

The institution known as the British Crown is in law defined as a corporation sole (Maitland 131-46) which, because it is an artificial creation, outlives its monarchical representatives who wave to citizen-subjects in much the same way that Mickey and Minnie Mouse wave to Disneyland tourists. It gives rise

²⁷ He also claimed to be King of France.

²⁸ Great Britain is the largest island among thousands of islands which form the archipelago of the British Isles, including the island of Ireland. At that time, 'Great Britain' was limited to a geographical description of an island comprising most of the territory of two independent political sovereign nations called England and Scotland.

²⁹ Queen Anne became the last monarch in line from Charles II, to rule separately over England and Scotland, and the first Queen of the Kingdom of Great Britain. Ireland would not be added to this mix for almost another hundred years in 1800.

³⁰ Several preceding monarchs beginning with James VI of Scotland, who subsequently also became James I of England, tried to imply that their 'Union of Crowns' was their authority to claim title as 'King of Great Britain,' but the validity of those claims was not accepted by either the ruling elite in England or Scotland.

³¹ The USA did not become a federal nation under its present constitution until June 21, 1788 with George Washington as its first president who held that office from April 30, 1789 to March 4, 1797.

³² See note 22

to the sloganeering chant that “The King is dead. Long live the King!”³³ It is this institution which holds the real power in today’s United Kingdom of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland. It is to the British Crown that the military swears its allegiance, and it is in its name that British courts administer their version of justice, and hold prisoners, and most importantly, it is by means of this institution that the wealth of the nation is controlled.

During the recently failed Referendum³⁴ regarding the question of whether Scotland should be an independent country,³⁵ the hope of the ‘Yes’ vote was to merely untangle the Union of 1707. Voters on both sides remained silent about the bogus coronation of 1651 when some in Scotland had crowned Charles II as “King of Great Britain.” They also remained silent on the subject of the republic which had united Scotland with England.

Therefore, it was not surprising that both sides in the 2014 Referendum debate remained silent about the true status of the currency presently in use by the United Kingdom; yet both sides danced around this currency maypole while chanting questions about ownership of the currency. However, neither side really wanted to answer that question because it was a conundrum from which neither side had an escape plan. Neither side wanted to tell the truth regarding the fraudulent way in which the governance of Great Britain has been conducted since 1649; nor the manner in which its bogus history has been promulgated to the masses.

The reason for their silence is easy to explain: The Crown is a subject that remains ‘off limits’ because it is founded upon a fraudulent series of events, and it is controlled by operatives who remain hidden within the shadows of Privy Council secrecy.³⁶ The identity of the Crown cannot be partially unraveled without taking events back to 1649, and that is why the term ‘Interregnum’ has always been used to prevent that from happening.

Jefferson’s Personal Links

When Jefferson wrote to Cartwright on June 3, 1824,³⁷ his letter of 1824 was penned a mere 48 years after Jefferson had helped to write the ‘Declaration of Independence’ on behalf of the USA confederacy, and it was only 35 years since the USA had been transformed into a federal nation. But in-between those two events, Connecticut’s Danbury Baptist Association had written to Jefferson on October 7, 1801 and they were complaining that their State legislature did not believe that the First Amendment to the 1789

³³ A cliché with both secular and religious claimed origins; in this instance it indicates continuity of Office (Crown), not current Office holder (or current monarch representing the Crown.)

³⁴ Scotland’s Referendum. The Scottish Government.

<http://www.scotreferendum.com> (accessed 15 November 2014)

³⁵ As of January 2014, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is comprised of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. England absorbed the area known as Wales beginning in 1536. According to the official *nunc pro tunc* version of current history, Scotland politically united with England in 1707. Ireland was absorbed into the UK during 1800, but in 1920, subsequent losses of territory on the island of Ireland, shrank UK territorial claims on that island to its north-eastern sector, which approximated the territory of an ancient kingdom called Ulster.

³⁶ It is interesting to note that the official Parliamentary explanation refers to the secret nature of the Privy Council while ‘The official website of the British Monarchy’ pretends that today there is nothing secret about it. See: Oonagh Gay and Anwen Rees, *The Privy Council: Standard Note: SN/PC/3708* (5 July 2005).

<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-3708.pdf>

and Queen and Privy Council. The Official Website of the British Monarchy.

<http://www.royal.gov.uk/MonarchUK/QueenandGovernment/QueenandPrivyCouncil.aspx>

(accessed 15 November 2014).

³⁷ Cartwright had attempted to foster republican ideals by establishing ‘Hampden Clubs’ in England and Scotland, which were named after John Hampden who helped to trigger the first of the civil wars. In Glasgow the famous Hampden Stadium still celebrates the lead-in to the ‘Interregnum.’

U.S. Constitution applied to their State. In reply to this Baptist organization on January 1, 1802, Jefferson who was President³⁸ at that time, wrote in part: "Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God the whole American people declared that their legislature would 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof', thus building a wall of separation between Church and State."³⁹

Three years before the U.S. adopted its federal Constitution in 1786, Thomas Jefferson toured some of the civil war battle sites of England with his friend and traveling companion, John Adams. In 1776, both men had been instrumental in creating the 'Declaration of Independence,' but instead of visiting a nation where all previous ill-feeling about that document was forgotten and forgiven, a few years after their visit, British warships fired upon the USA during the War of 1812, giving rise to events described in its national anthem 'The Star Spangled Banner.' It was also during that time that British troops invaded Washington, DC and set fire to both the White House and the Library of Congress. The British waited to invade New Orleans after that phase of hostilities had nominally come to an end.⁴⁰

Even before the creation of the confederated United States of America in 1776, political and religious refugees had struggled to reach America's shores. On board the *Mayflower*, which had sailed 156 years earlier in 1620, there were passengers with neo-Anabaptist beliefs.⁴¹ Their tormentors included officials in control of the State Church of England, which specifically named Anabaptists as enemies.⁴² All of this was more than mere national history to Jefferson, because it was specifically a part of his family history.

In 1649, which was 29 years after the *Mayflower* sailed for North America, King Charles I was executed and the era of republic began in England. Unfortunately, the departed King's son decided to fight on until he was finally defeated at Worcester. Jefferson had reason to know the intimate details of the Royalist

³⁸ March 4, 1801 to March 4, 1809.

³⁹ Unfortunately there is no historical collection of Baptist archives, as such. See: American Baptist Historical Society. [http://abconn.org/history/index.php?title=American Baptist Historical Society](http://abconn.org/history/index.php?title=American_Baptist_Historical_Society) (accessed 15 November 2014).

"The American Baptist Historical Society (ABHS) is the oldest Baptist historical society in the United States... It was established in 1853... Destruction of archives in 1896... when a fire destroyed the ABHS collection". The collection was reassembled from other sources after this date, such as: James Hutson, 'A Wall of Separation.'

FBI Helps Restore Jefferson's Obliterated Draft. Library of Congress

<http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danbury.html>

and Jefferson's Letter to the Danbury Baptists (1 January 1801).

<http://www.heritage.org/initiatives/first-principles/primary-sources/jefferson-s-letter-to-the-danbury-baptists> (accessed 15 November 2014).

⁴⁰ In 1959 the 'Battle of New Orleans' became a hit for singer Johnny Horton

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nfESmRwHCMc>

(accessed 15 November 2014).

⁴¹ The history of the Anabaptists is both complicated and lengthy and beyond the scope of this article. Therefore as a means of linkage only, we offer this basic explanation: On the island of Great Britain Anabaptists eventually became known simply as 'Baptists.' They were divided theologically into two distinct groups identified as being 'General' (Arminian) or 'Particular' (Calvinistic).

http://www.abc-usa.org/what_we_believe/our-history

(accessed 15 November 2014).

Many on board the *Mayflower* adhered to "The Believers Baptism' (submersion of adults instead of sprinkling upon infants), and concurred that: "...all that believed were together, and had all things common." Cited: *Book of Acts* 2:44, King James Version.

⁴² See: E. Belfort Bax, *Rise and Fall of the Anabaptists*. New York: American Scholar Publications, 1966 (1903). Print. Page 332 *supra*

defeat, because Royalist reinforcements were cut-off before they reached Worcester by an Army led by Colonel Robert Lilburne. He was a Baptist fighting for issues with which Jefferson identified.⁴³

The First Amendment to the federal U.S. Constitution specifically forbids the federal government from interfering with the free exercise of religion: it can neither assist, nor resist religious worship.⁴⁴ While this was a doctrine that Jefferson agreed with, it also provided another reason why there was more than a genealogical bond between the Lilburne and Jefferson families. When Thomas Jefferson arrived as a tourist accompanied by his on-again, off-again, on-again friend John Adams, both men were well aware of the Lilburne name. It was no coincidence that the Virginia house Thomas Jefferson was born in was called 'Shadwell,' because it had been named after a parish east of the City of London where his grandfather Isham Randolph on his maternal line, had married Jane Lilburne. But when the Shadwell family home burned down, Thomas' father moved his family into a house name Edge Hill,⁴⁵ and that is where Thomas grew up.

Thomas Jefferson's mother was the daughter of Jane Lilburne, who came from a line stretching back to an uncle of Robert and John. Jane married twice, and as Jane Rogers, she married Isham Randolph. This couple produced Jefferson's mother, who gave birth to his sister named Lucy. She married Charles Lilburne Lewis, who gave one of her sons the first name of Lilburne. Thomas' brother Randolph also gave one of his children the first name of Lilburne.

John Adams' Speech at Worcester, England

Colonel Robert Lilburne was only one of several in the Lilburne family who played important parts during the civil wars. After his Army caused the final collapse of the Royalist military cause at Worcester, Robert Lilburne was sent to Scotland to maintain martial law from a headquarters at Dalkeith,⁴⁶ and that is where he became Acting Commander of all Military Forces on land.

It was because Robert was in command, that he was able to throw open the doors to the founding of both Baptist⁴⁷ and Quaker congregations in Scotland. However, post-'Interregnum' accounts of Baptist congregations in Scotland are a prime example of Orwellian expurgation at work. In this instance its victims are '*unable to remember real events*,' because the history of the Baptist Church in Scotland just vanishes from the scene once the republic is overthrown. The Baptist Union of Scotland reports that many of Robert Lilburne's men were "Baptist soldiers who used their influence to establish small churches in Leith, Perth, Cupar, Ayr and Aberdeen."⁴⁸

⁴³ "Here was buried Thomas Jefferson—Author of the Declaration of American Independence of the Statute of Virginia for religious freedom and Father of the University of Virginia." Jefferson's Grave. The Jefferson Monticello.

<http://www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/jeffersons-gravestone>

(accessed 16 November 2014).

⁴⁴ See: First Amendment. Legal Information Institute.

http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/first_amendment

(accessed 16 November 2014).

⁴⁵ Named after the first major battle of the civil wars.

⁴⁶ Near Edinburgh, see retrieval:

<https://www.google.com/maps/place/Dalkeith,+Midlothian,+UK/data=!4m2!3m1!1s0x4887b8df46ee3db9:0x3b282fa3a5acb1a0?sa=X&ei=MSRrVP7rL4jqaKuXgLG&ved=0CIABEPIBMA>

(Accessed 18 November, 2014).

⁴⁷About Us: The Baptist Union of Scotland Today—Scan down to 'History.'

<http://www.scottishbaptist.org.uk/about-us>

(Accessed 16 November, 2014).

⁴⁸*Ibid.*

When General George Monck⁴⁹ took over from Lilburne about a year later, he turned back the hands of time by re-imposing religious intolerance once more.⁵⁰ Consequently, Baptist congregations disappeared for the next one hundred years, and during that time "Baptist life in Scotland ceased to exist."⁵¹

In April 1786, while Jefferson and Adams were on their tour of England, they arrived at Fort Royal Hill in Worcester. That is where the Royalist dream had been finally terminated on September 3, 1651, with the essential assistance of Robert Lilburne's troops. The former battlefield was not far from Edgehill where the first battle in a series of civil wars had begun at, during 1642. But it was in Worcester that Adams delivered a speech which he noted in his diary:

at Worcester that I was provoked and asked, "*And do Englishmen so soon forget the Ground where Liberty was fought for? Tell your Neighbors and your Children that this is holy Ground, much holier than that on which your Churches stand. All England should come in Pilgrimage to this Hill, once a Year.*" This animated them, and they seemed much Edgehill and Worcester were curious and interesting to us, as Scaenes where Freemen had fought for their Rights. The People in the Neighborhood, appeared so ignorant and careless pleased with it. Perhaps their Aukwardness [sic] before might arise from their Uncertainty of our Sentiments concerning the Civil Wars.⁵²

Adams asked in amazement: '*And do Englishmen so soon forget the ground where liberty was fought for?*' His answer would have to wait until it arrived in the form of a novel explanation hundreds of years later, during April 1946. That is when it was penned by George Orwell in that lonely farmhouse on the bleak Scottish island of Jura. Orwell might well have re-written his answer as "they are unable to remember real events and they persuade themselves that they remember other events which never happened."

However, by 1786 it was not only a case of Englishmen at Worcester forgetting about "the Ground where Liberty was fought for," or Scots who forgot to ask the real question about their union with England during their failed Referendum of 2014. Americans have seemingly joined the ranks of the forgetful and adopted the attitude that Jefferson and Adams must have dreamed-up, a concept of individual rights when they wrote the 'Declaration of Independence.' Although Jefferson did not acknowledge his real sources of inspiration, a United States Supreme Court Justice undertook that task for him, albeit about 120 years after Jefferson's death (Gilder and Hagger, "The Pedigree" 217-26).

The Supreme Court Remembers

While Robert was a Baptist, his brother John had drifted from Puritan to Quaker (Feuer 39) by the time he died. 'Freeborn John' was more-or-less led by the circumstances in which he found himself, and this is

⁴⁹ Monck became a failed mentor to General Benedict Arnold, who adopted the code name of 'Monck' during the U.S. Revolutionary War, when he switched sides as Monck had done, because Arnold thought that the British would win. While it worked well for Monck, Arnold's side lost and he went down in history as being a byword for traitor.

<http://clements.umich.edu/exhibits/online/spies/stories-arnold-1.html>

(accessed 16 November 2014).

⁵⁰ '*Monk, indeed, did all he could to repress them.*' David Douglas, *History of the Baptist Churches in the North of England from 1648 to 1845*. London: Houlston and Stoneman, 1846. Print.

⁵¹ See note 35

⁵² John Adams diary 44, 27 March - 21 July 1786: Adams Family Papers. Massachusetts Historical Society.

<http://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/archive/doc?id=D44>

(accessed 14 November, 2014).

Some of the lines of the original diary are preceded by what appear to be quotation marks, and highlighted above with italics. (John Adams' original handwritten pages are also reproduced on this site).

how he developed his skills as both a writer and orator. His fiery legal career began with a landmark trial,⁵³ in 1637, when he established his right to remain silent, and he made it clear that he would be a slave to none.

That Star Chamber court hearing took place during the reign of Charles I, and its importance was later noted by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black. Beginning in 1947, Black began to footnote the works of John Lilburne in several of his written Opinions,⁵⁴ and he also cited them as being a precursor to the U.S. Bill of Rights (Black 39-43; Gilder and Hagger 217-26). He was joined by fellow Justice William O. Douglas and Chief Justice Earl Warren, who also noted the contributions made by John Lilburne. But it was Warren who delivered the majority Opinion in that landmark case of *Miranda vs. Arizona*,⁵⁵ and supported his Opinion with references to John Lilburne. However, on October 31, 1988, *Newsweek* magazine ran a major article, "Loss of Liberties, Britain's War on Terror," which began with these words: "In 1649 John Lilburne fought a charge of high treason in a London court by claiming that 'the good old laws of England' permitted silence on questions 'against or concerning myself.' Last week the Lilburne principle fell victim to London's stepped-up war against Irish Republican Army terrorism" (47).

The visit by Jefferson and Adams during 1786 took place a mere ten years after they crafted the 1776 *Declaration of Independence*, and noted that the reigning King George III of Great Britain had created "a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States."

However, Jefferson remained politically quiet during his visit, and his own notes were made as a tourist about the architectural, botanical and scientific information that he stumbled across during his vacation.⁵⁶

Obfuscating the Issues

Several decades ago on November 17, 1989, Roy Hattersley,⁵⁷ then Deputy Leader of the British Labor Party, appeared on CSPAN television in the USA. Mervyn Hagger had the chance to ask him why a written constitution does not govern the affairs of the people in the British Isles. A portion of his response in the context of this article is quite illuminating, and therefore it is worth repeating here. Hattersley replied: "...why don't we have a written Constitution?... it doesn't fit our Parliamentary system of government. If we incorporated a written Constitution into our processes, any government could overturn it in a single line Bill."⁵⁸

⁵³ February 13, 1637. Court of Star Chamber. British History Online.

<http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=74904&strquery=john%20lilburne>
(accessed 16 November 2014).

⁵⁴ Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); dissent: Hugo L. Black.

http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/332/46#writing-USSC_CR_0332_0046_ZD
(accessed 16 November 2014).

⁵⁵ Miranda v. Arizona. Legal Information Institute.

<http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/384/436>
(accessed 16 November 2014).

⁵⁶ Notes on a Tour of English Country Seats, &c., with Thomas Jefferson, 4–10? April 1786. Founders Online, The National Archives

<http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/01-03-02-0005-0002-0001>
(accessed 16 November 2014).

⁵⁷ Lord Hattersley

<http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/lords/lord-hattersley/858>
(accessed 16 November 2014).

⁵⁸ CSPAN, November 17, 1989, *Brian Lamb Book Review Program*: with printed words as transcribed by Mervyn Hagger from a recording of this broadcast.

The Parliament to which Roy Hattersley referred is the Parliament in London, of which only the House of Commons. Hattersley used to sit in that House as an elected Member of Parliament, but not anymore. He is now a Member of the unelected House of Lords and a Member of the secretive Privy Council.⁵⁹ Hattersley has for years claimed to be a republican,⁶⁰ and therefore on paper, against a monarchical form of government. Although he said that a written Constitution “doesn’t fit our Parliamentary system of government,” it is because the Crown occupies the same spot that would be occupied by a written Constitution, that it “doesn’t fit our Parliamentary system of government.” That is the reason why Parliament has limited powers that would enable a written Constitution introduced by Parliament at a level beneath the Crown, to be overturned by Parliament “in a single line Bill.”

Hattersley admitted that this was true, but said that ‘The People’ liked it this way: “The tradition of Great Britain, the spirit of Great Britain, the feelings of The People of Great Britain is that we run by individual items of legislation and you can’t superimpose a written constitution onto a system where People are expecting and reacting and supporting something quite different.”⁶¹

Then Hattersley claimed that: “a declaration, ...a statement, ...a Constitution is putting the interpretation of those powers into the hands of the courts, and in our experience, the sort of freedoms that we want to see, the sort of extensions of liberties are not best interpreted by courts, but by politically motivated, intentionally motivated Parliaments...”⁶²

In other words, Hattersley believes that a “one man show” that can dictate to ‘The People,’ is what ‘The People’ want. This was the basis upon which the autocratic BBC was originally formed, because it bowed to the will of John Reith, and John Reith was quite specific about why the BBC was formed and what it intended to do. His reasoning was that ‘The People’ did not know what they wanted, and so he would tell them, while making sure that his view about what was good and what was bad, was imposed upon them, for their own good (Gilder and Hagger, “John Reith” 137-44).

It was this dictatorial approach that allowed Oliver Cromwell to become ‘The Protector’ of the new republic that was created following the abolition of the monarchy, because while Cromwell executed a man, he did not destroy the institution of the Crown. The 13 North American colonies did that with their ‘*Declaration of Independence*,’ but Cromwell’s cronies even offered him the title of ‘King,’⁶³ if he wanted it, because they had retained the very institution that was the cause of the problem, no matter who was the monarch, or what title that person was known by. Cromwell presided over a faux republic.

John Lilburne repeatedly clashed with Oliver Cromwell on the issue of the nation’s sovereignty, because Lilburne was pushing for the adoption in England of a written constitution called ‘*An Agreement of the Free People of England*.’⁶⁴ If such a document had replaced the institution of the Crown, then the

⁵⁹ See note 32

⁶⁰ “As an anti-monarchist...” and “If monarchists condescended to argue with republicans like me...” excerpts from Roy Hattersley. The Queen can help free Ireland from history. *The Times* (London); May 17, 2011.

<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/columnists/article3021622.ece>

(accessed 16 November 2014).

⁶¹ See note 51

⁶² See note 51

⁶³ The interchangeability of the words ‘monarch,’ ‘king’ and ‘queen’ with ‘crown,’ when talking about the representative of the Crown as an institution, can lead to confusion, which may or may not be intentional. It is another example of words losing their ability to communicate in an Orwellian manner. See: “In February 1657, a group of MPs headed by Lord Broghill presented a new constitution known as *The Humble Petition and Advice* under which Cromwell was formally offered the crown.” (Oliver Cromwell, 1599-1658. BCW Project)

<http://bcw-project.org/biography/oliver-cromwell>

(accessed 16 November 2014).

⁶⁴ See details of various editions at An Agreement of the People. BCW Project.

<http://bcw-project.org/church-and-state/second-civil-war/agreement-of-the-people>

people of Scotland would have been free to decide upon their own legal framework for governance. The result of Lilburne's continual confrontations with Cromwell's supporters was resolved by imprisoning him for the remainder of his life in Dover Castle.⁶⁵

Extirpation by Redaction

It is only necessary to see what happened after Charles II died on February 6, 1685 to understand the *modus operandi* of both the English and Scottish Crown institutions at work. His successor was James II in England and James VII in Scotland (and a list of other titles). But he did not last long, because the movers and shakers who controlled both the Crown corporation sole in England and Scotland, deposed him. Then they ran him out of the country when he would not abide by their wishes.⁶⁶

The next move by these people behind the scenes was to invite a Dutch prince to take over the vacancy left by the king who had just been forced out, and that is when William of Orange was installed with his wife Mary as co-monarch. They arrived with enough foreign troops to make sure that their coup would not be overturned by supporters of the king, who had been thrown off his throne. With a flourish of Orwellian irony, their supporters branded the arrival of this pair as the 'Glorious Revolution.'⁶⁷

After William and Mary came Anne, and it was during her reign as the separate Queen of England and Queen of Scotland that the controlling agents in England blackmailed their counterparts in Scotland into accepting a financial bail-out for their failed South American colony of Darien.⁶⁸ That was to be the price paid⁶⁹ for shutting down their Scottish Parliament. Thus, in 1707, the Kingdom of Great Britain finally came to life with the same Queen Anne as its first monarch.⁷⁰

From here the story of the Kingdom of Great Britain switches to a line of German kings who led the way to King George III. About this king, Jefferson wrote in the U.S. Declaration of Independence: "A Prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people." The North American colonists decided that the only way to free themselves from the British

(accessed 16 November 2014).

⁶⁵ See details of his imprisonment through letters to his wife, *The Resurrection of John Lilburne, Now a Prisoner in Dover-Castle*. Street Corner Society.

<http://www.streccorsoc.org/docs/resurrection1.html>

(accessed 16 November 2014).

⁶⁶ King James II (1685-1688). Royal Family History

<http://www.britroyals.com/kings.asp?id=james2>

(accessed 16 November 2014).

⁶⁷ "Revolutionaries.... hope to recast popular memory to justify the new order." See: Melinda Zook, "The Bloody Azzines: Whig Martyrdom and Memory after the Glorious Revolution." *Albion*. Vol. 27, No. 3 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 373-396.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4051734> (accessed 18 November, 2014)

and: *The Glorious Revolution*.

<http://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/parliamentaryauthority/revolution>

(accessed 16 November 2014).

⁶⁸ See map and other details in Richard Cavendish, "Founding of the Darien Colony."

<http://www.historytoday.com/richard-cavendish/founding-darien-colony>

(accessed 16 November 2014).

⁶⁹ Robert Burns penned his 1791 poem marking this episode with the title: 'Such A Parcel Of Rogues In A Nation.' *Burns Country*.

<http://www.robertburns.org/works/344.shtml>

(accessed 16 November 2014).

⁷⁰ Anne (r.1702-1714). The Official Website of the British Monarchy.

[http://www.royal.gov.uk/historyofthemonarchy/scottish%20monarchs\(400ad-1603\)/thestewarts/anne.aspx](http://www.royal.gov.uk/historyofthemonarchy/scottish%20monarchs(400ad-1603)/thestewarts/anne.aspx)

(accessed 16 November 2014).

Crown was to issue a declaration of independence. Their Declaration was not accepted at face value by the British Crown, which then turned to German mercenaries⁷¹ in order to wage war on the renegade colonists. By 2014, this lesson had been lost on the Scots who in turn lost their Referendum seeking independence. Debates surrounding the issue of Scottish independence were redacted in order to prevent the issue of the Crown from being discussed. Therefore, since the Crown holds the finality of power governing today's United Kingdom, by not discussing Crown sovereignty, both sides of the issue failed to discuss whether Scotland should be an independent country, with the corporation sole which currently holds that sovereignty.

Conclusions

After reviewing the record of actual events which have taken place, it becomes readily apparent why Orwell could write: *You are unable to remember real events and you persuade yourself that you remember other events which never happened.* Therefore, we should try to discover what it is that we should collectively remember, but which we have collectively forgotten. It is the opposite of the lines sung by Elvis: *I forgot to remember to forget her...*, because we have remembered something that never was, and in doing so, we have thus forgotten to remember something that did happen. We have forgotten why in 1786 John Adams attributed so much importance to the events which had taken place in 1651 at Fort Royal Hill, just outside of Worcester in England, and we have forgotten to remember why Thomas Jefferson would have immediately picked up on Adams' reference to Edgehill.

If civil war reenactments have not buried the real story by diverting our attention to battles over shed blood, instead of considering the spilled ink that has blotted out the basic question of individual human rights, then obfuscation by glorification of the present Queen Elizabeth, surely has. But even here obfuscation is at work. There has only been one Queen Elizabeth in Scotland, and that is the present monarch. The 'other' Queen Elizabeth was a product of English monarchical madness that had nothing to do with the Scots. Yet we persist in calling the current Queen, 'Elizabeth II.' This is part of the transfer of terminology whereby the word 'British' has come to mean 'English,' as though the Scots do not exist. It is the equivalent of describing all Americans as Californians.

But this process of obfuscation does not stop there. The world of anniversaries is now about to once again celebrate 'Magna Carta' of 1215, ignoring the fact that there were several of these documents. The celebrations also ignore the fact that the 1215 edition was annulled by the Pope, one month after it had been signed by King John of England.⁷² But what did King John or his Magna Carta have to do with the Kingdom of Scotland? The answer is nothing, nothing at all, because John was not the King of Scotland.⁷³ But this will not deter the many engaged in obfuscation as a means of selling a fantasy version of history to tourists as 'British' history.

⁷¹ Hessians. Chronicle of the Revolution. Liberty! The American Revolution.

http://www.pbs.org/ktca/liberty/popup_hessians.html

(accessed 16 November 2014).

⁷² "His conflict with the Church led to his excommunication. The annulment of Magna Carta by Pope Innocent III in August 1215, at John's request, led to a renewal of the baronial revolt which was still raging when John died in October 1216." Magna Carta: People and society. Magna Carta. British Library.

<http://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-people-and-society>

(accessed 16 November 2014).

⁷³ After King James VI of Scotland who was King James I of England, references were made to the king ruling over territory, and not people.

While critics may laugh⁷⁴ at the idea of an Australian reenacting the life of William Wallace and events that never happened, while at the same time ignoring many events that did happen during the actual life of this man, the 1995 movie *Braveheart* has been taken to heart by the promoters of Scottish tourism as a useful tool to rid visitors of their 'spare change.'

Therefore, we should also remember that Orwell wrote his tale about a dictionary while huddling from the cold on that bleak Scottish isle. Unlike the title of his novel, the publication date of that dictionary is still in the future, because the work of ridding our collective lives-lived of reality by means of obfuscation through redaction is still a work in progress. Best of all for the scriptwriters, it is also a process that seems to be both entertaining and one that makes money.

Perhaps one day we will all come to love 'Big Brother'. There is still time, because 2050 is still well into the future, our future, the future of us all.⁷⁵

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⁷⁴ "Critics Consensus: Distractingly Violent and Historically Dodgy." *Braveheart* (1995). <http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/1065684-braveheart> (accessed 16 November 2014).

⁷⁵ "...the struggle was finished. He loved Big Brother." The concluding words in Orwell's novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four*: p.256.

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The Higher *Raison D'Etat* and the Supreme Imperative of World Peace, as Decisive Factors for all Signatories of the Treaty of Trianon (1920-1921) in Its Final Stages. The Treaty Ratification by Romania

Abstract: The complete history of the Treaty of Trianon should necessarily include its final phase, the ratification of the Treaty by the signatories, as a condition for its entry into force. By analyzing the history of its ratification (1920-1921), our survey makes considerations on the historiography of this Treaty and on the need to broaden its scope at the level of 21st century standards. The decisive factors in the process and implementation of the Treaty have been—if we ignore the divergences over details - the consciousness of general political responsibility, of the *raison d'état* of each signatory Party, of World Peace as the Supreme Reason. Therefore, the Treaty of Trianon may be considered as a valuable chapter in the knowledge of history, a test of conscience and responsible reflection that creatively look forward to the world of today and tomorrow.

Keywords: ratifications, historiography, higher *raison d'état*, Peace as its Supreme interest, perception of the Treaty.

Introduction

The historical event of signing the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary, on June 4, 1920, at Trianon, marked the completion, politically speaking, of this fundamental act of law and international relations, in the contemporary epoch.⁷⁶ This crucial political moment was followed by the requisite legal procedures, i.e. the ratification by the signatory States, as a condition of form and substance regulating the effective entry into force of the Treaty.

⁷⁶ The full, original, official text in French and its translation into the Romanian language—in: *Desăvârșirea unității național-statale a poporului român. Recunoașterea ei internațională*, vol.6, doc. No. 890 (București: Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1986), 142-272 (in French), 272-399 (in Romanian). It is divided into 14 parts (I-XIV), containing 364 articles, followed finally by a Protocol and a Statement. The official text was written in French and German. According to art. 364, "In case of dispute, the French text will be used for reference, except in Part I—Covenant of the League of Nations—and Part XIII—Labor—where the French and the English texts shall have the same weight." The Plenipotentiaries of the signatory States "signed the present Treaty issued at Trianon in a single copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic, on the basis of which, authenticated copies will be issued to each of the Signatory Powers." The scientific historic research of the complexity and implications of the Treaty of Trianon has increasingly felt the need for a BIBLIOGRAPHY that should be wide, comprehensive, international and focused on its analytical themes. This bibliography should form the basis for further studies on the legal-historic, socio-cultural, political significance, as a fundamental act of contemporary international relations. For those with a vested interest in denying the importance of the Treaty, mention should be made that 34 states were involved in its causal loop, conclusion and signing, which means most of the states and WORLD population at that time.

Discussion

For Romania, as an Associated Power, The Draft Law ratifying the Treaty of Peace, the Protocol and the Annexed Declaration, signed at Trianon, became the subject of an extraordinary session of Romania's Senate⁷⁷ via the Royal Message, issued on August 9, 1920.

The Delegates of the five Senate sections (in this order: Spiru Gheorghiu, D. Alexandrescu, C. Meitani, Lazăr Popescu and N. Batzaria) met on August 11, 1920, under the chairmanship of C. Meitani, designated D. Alexandrescu as rapporteur and unanimously admitted the said Draft.

The Draft Law presentation in the Senate plenary took place in the session held on August 14, 1920, after passing and voting the Draft Law for the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, signed in Versailles on June 28, 1919.

The Draft Law for the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon included a single article wherein "The Government is authorized to ratify and implement the Treaty." In the explanatory memorandum regarding the Draft Law, signed by Take Ionescu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the emphasis was on the crucial importance of the Treaty that endorsed the unity of the Romanian national state. "Alongside the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon, the relationship between Hungary and us will become normal"—read the Draft Law statement of reasons.

The meeting of the Romanian Senate devoted to the debating on the Draft Law for the ratification of the Treaty of Peace from Trianon was moderated by the Senate Chairman, General C. Coandă. Nine senators participated in the debates: I. Păcurariu, Ion Nistor, Ibrahim Themo, G. G. Mironescu, Liviu Micșa, Christache Georgescu, George Bilașco, Gen. Silviu Herbay and Eugeniu Bran. Of these, five represented the historical provinces that had joined Romania. The debate continued throughout 16 to 17 August 1920, and ended with Take Ionescu's speech and the passing of the Law.

The proceedings were dominated by the insistent assertion of the fundamental political and historical importance of the Treaty of Peace from Trianon for Romania, as well as the minute analysis of the dissatisfaction generated by the provisions regarding the drawing of the Banat and Maramureș borders.

The most substantial presentation, with an overall fundamental historic outlook, was made by the remarkable historian Ion Nistor (*Desbaterile Ședința* 629-634), while issues regarding the Banat and Maramureș regions received particular attention from the representatives of those areas. The presentations made by the latter disclosed issues or opinions regarding the painstaking progress of the Peace Conference proceedings, of their intricacies and difficulties. The best informed speakers expressed opinions on a number of relevant articles and specific provisions included in the Treaty of Trianon:

We, the inhabitants of Transylvania, have been looking forward impatiently to the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, so that, by sanctioning the rule of law and fact, one might dispel some vain hopes harbored by our Hungarian brothers, who have turned into Romanian citizens. We, the members of the National Party, are voting for the ratification of this Treaty. When we do that, we are keen on getting some sort of guidance regarding our relations with the neighboring state, Hungary.

—asserted Senator Liviu Micșa (*Desbaterile Ședința* 637) in his speech. "We do realize that in Hungary and, perhaps, also among some of our citizens of Hungarian descent, there is a state of discontent in the wake of this Treaty"—added the same Senator, claiming that "we can only regret this discontent and try to make them understand that the territories for which we have fought are our share, based on historic rights and based on the natural law." The speaker emphasized the importance of the minority rights provisions contained in the epoch-making Resolution from Alba Iulia (*Desbaterile Ședința* 638-639). As he also dealt

⁷⁷ *Desbaterile Parlamentare. Senatul. Sesiunea din 1920. Ședintele din 14, 16, 17 August 1920 (sesiune extraordinară); no.32, 22 August 1920, 623-628; no. 33, 24 August 1920, Ședintele din 16 august 1920, 629-639; no.34, 26 August 1920, Ședința din 17 august 1920, 647-658*

with some topical domestic political problems, Senator Liviu Mica's speech generated some clarifications (Gh. Fleşariu, Ilie Beu), the discussion taking the risky turn of political disputes that went beyond the topic of the debates (the effects of the change in government in Transylvania). Senator Liviu Micşa emphasized the need for administrative reform based on the principle of decentralization and warned of misconduct—revealed by the press—in dealing with the minorities. The conclusion of this speech was devoted to the need of regulating the issue of Austro-Hungarian war securities in favor of those for whom their recovery was of a vital necessity (*Desbaterile Şedinţa* 638-639).

An extensive exposé on the Maramureş state border was conducted with particular expertise in the Senate plenum by Senator Bilaşco (*Desbaterile Şedinţa* 650-652), a representative of the said area. Other speeches on relevant historic and current political issues regarding Transylvania were made by Senators Silviu Herbay (*Desbaterile Şedinţa* 652-654) and Eugen Bran (*Desbaterile Şedinţa* 654-656).

The Senate deliberations on the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon were comprehensive, substantial, held at a high level of national political responsibility. The explanatory inroads regarding some sources of dissatisfaction on the border issue in Banat and Maramureş smacked of an acute moral dilemma, which did not go as far as targeting the very Treaty, whose ratification was at that particular moment and beyond, an issue of *higher raison d'état*. These overall problems of substance were synthesized in the remarkable concluding speech delivered in the Senate by Take Ionescu (*Desbaterile Şedinţa* 656-658), as Minister of Foreign Affairs and the initiator of the Draft Law for the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon. The speaker placed special emphasis on the importance of the Treaty, on the signature placed on this Treaty by Romania's representatives, on the political responsibility that was incumbent upon Romania in its foreign policy and international relations. These fundamental dominant realities asked for careful attention, including the perception of more sensitive issues relating to borders. Take Ionescu, as a diplomat of high repute as well as a leader of the domestic political scene, had enough insight to be able to grasp the grounds for the dissatisfaction on such sensitive matters as the border issue, but he was adamant in rejecting any possible side effect they might have on the Treaty to be ratified. As a politician, he could admit "that Romania's map might have looked quite differently had the Romanian State known how to handle it" (*Desbaterile Şedinţa* 656). He himself knew very well and in detail about the unsatisfactory performance of some representatives of the Romanian state present at the great forum of the Paris Peace Conference. According to Take Ionescu's political vision, Romania's relations with Hungary were to undergo both a quantitative and a qualitative change and development.

We are frankly determined to make it easy for Hungary, in order to ensure good relationship with this country. I can understand Hungary's pain. From its prewar state to the present one, from that Hungary, that used to bridge in its walk the Carpathians with the Adriatic Sea, to the present-day Hungary, there is a huge difference. Obviously, their pain must be great, the more so as Hungary left its minorities in the new neighboring states. In the future, Hungary will have to face its internal material difficulties and the hardships caused by the existence of Hungarian minorities in the new states. Nevertheless, Hungary too should consider the Treaty as final, no matter how they feel about it. To this latter breed of Hungarians, we ought to reach out. (*Desbaterile Şedinţa* 658)

At the end of the fairly extensive deliberations, the Draft Law for the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon was adopted by the Senate of Romania with 68 white balls and one black ball (*Desbaterile Şedinţa* 658). The validation procedure of the Draft Law for the ratification of the Treaty continued, in accordance with the constitutional provisions, by discussing the Draft in the extraordinary session of the Assembly of Deputies, on the 25th and the 26th of August, 1920 (*Desbaterile Sesiunea* 1282-1288; 1289-1302).

The meeting, held on August 25, 1920, by the Assembly of Deputies (*Desbaterile Sesiunea* 1282-1288), led by Chairman Duiliu Zamfirescu, concluded the debate on the Treaty of Peace with Germany at Versailles, by voting the Draft Law for its ratification (142 white balls, one black ball), passing immediately

to the deliberations on the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary. The deliberation went at a faster pace due to the fact that some of the preliminary proceedings initiated by the Royal Message on August 9, 1920, had been taken care of by the Senate. Thus, the Committee of Delegates of the seven sections (I. Lăzărescu, D. Rădulescu—President, Bobeș Panait, Al. Bilciurescu, Dr. Ion Jacob, Florian Heredeu and D.R. Ioanițescu—Rapporteur) met the same day of August 25, 1920, admitted without any restraint the Draft Law authorizing the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon, presenting the Report in the plenary session of the Assembly of Deputies in the afternoon of the same day. There was no need, therefore, for the Rapporteur's introductory speech or the statement of reasons from the Minister in charge. The Delegates Committee "looked into the Draft Law passed by the Senate, and accepted it without restraint, just as submitted" and asked for the approval of the Assembly of Deputies.

The general debate started rather abruptly, signaling that deliberations on the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon were likely to point to the sensitive issue of dissatisfaction over drawing up the south-west, west and north borders of Romania (Banat—Crișana—Sătmar—Maramureș). The first speaker, deputy Avram Imbroane, after an introductory speech, filed a statement on behalf of the Banat Romanian MPs from all political parties represented in the House (16 signatories), who asserted that they would "vote against the act of ratifying a treaty that is embedded with injustice." This was followed by a substantial exposé delivered by MP Dumitru Lascu (*Desbaterile Sesiunea* 1283-1288) regarding the westernmost borderline in the Arad, Bihor and Satu Mare regions. This exposé may be considered as most important, of great scientific and historical interest, for its in-depth analysis of real facts and details. The meeting on the first day ended after midnight with the general speech delivered by Amos Frâncu.

Upon resuming the debates (Thursday, August 26, 1920) (*Desbaterile Sesiunea* 1289-1302), MP Gaspar Muth, the representative of the Banat Swabians, took the floor and protested against the division of the Banat region, as well as against the fact that the Swabians had not been included in Article 11 of the 1919 Treaty on Minorities (regarding the church and school autonomy of the Swabians, Saxons and Széklers). Then the Declaration of an MP representing the Maramureș area (read in absentia) deplored the fact that the Romanians inhabiting Tisa's right bank area were left outside the country. On behalf of the Socialist Party, MP N. D. Cocca took the floor for a short exposé that only dealt with some general war issues. Traian Lalescu, though a signatory of the above-mentioned Declaration of the Romanian MPs from Banat, resumed the argument and delivered a personal comment.

Maniu's speech in the House and Take Ionescu's one in the Senate rose to the highest level of political thought, eloquence and style, dominating the parliamentary debates devoted to the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon through their comprehensive scope, subtlety of approach, conscience and responsibility to be found only in a genuine statesman, rather than in a mere political orator. The leader of the Romanian National Party from Transylvania paid a heartfelt historic eulogy to the forerunners and perpetrators of the Union, stressing the need "to ascend into higher spheres and let our soul rise higher so that we might move forward." Iuliu Maniu drew the audience's attention to the specific and definitive fact that

the true source of the unity of the Romanian people is not this Treaty, but the vivid consciousness of the Romanian people and its sovereign ruling. This great achievement springs in fact from decisions made in Bukovina, Bessarabia and Transylvania. This Treaty (of Trianon) only stands for an international recognition, a consolidated Union at the international level and a more powerful State.

But this Treaty—continued Maniu—

has its shady parts. It is human and I would say it is fatal it were so. These shadows cause us a lot of pain. However great was the joy over the Union as an epoch-making event, we need to deal with the painful parts, (but) they are not allowed to obscure the large and grand perspective upon this accomplishment of the Romanian nation. (*Desbaterile Sesiunea* 1292-1296)

By making these emphatic and nuanced statements, the illustrious orator indirectly but implicitly gave the right answer and provided a wise guidance, uttered at the right moment and at a time when one could still feel the influence of emotional states, partial views, trends that could affect the thorough comprehension of the major historical and political underpinnings. The public expression of these complex truths was particularly necessary, they could not be glossed over or avoided, no matter how difficult it was to approach them or draw conclusions likely to contribute decisively to their solution. Fully aware of the heavy responsibility of such a political statement, Maniu did not hesitate to spell out concretely and analytically the pains that hovered like shadows over the general satisfaction of accomplishing the Great Union.

With remarkable political lucidity, Maniu summed up the main features regarding the border definition for Banat, Crişana and Maramureş, dubbed as “an unfathomable whimsical game.” He stated that “this situation, if only one had deeper insight into the matter and more diligence in insisting upon that area of our great national interests, one could have found a remedy.” Maniu also considered that some provisions regarding the ethnic minorities were likely to be detrimental to Romania’s sovereignty, but he once again highlighted the importance of ensuring minority rights, of promoting the spirit of tolerance of the Romanian people. In like manner, the speaker commented on other provisions of the Treaty of Trianon, especially the financial ones, referring then to some aspects of the activity of the Governing Council, whose President he was, regarding the preparation of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary. The speaker could not totally refrain—in his capacity of leading the national opposition—from some critical remarks addressed to his political adversaries in power, whose expected retaliation came through the voice of Duiliu Zamfirescu. It is significant that, at the end of his speech, Iuliu Maniu was keen on placing special emphasis on the important and necessary changes to be made in the Romanian-Hungarian relations. “When we have completed this process, we will not be carrying a grudge against our neighbors; in our near future there should be a true brotherhood between our nations” (*Desbaterile Sesiunea 1292-1296*).

The speech held by Take Ionescu, the Foreign Minister, at the end of the deliberations of the Assembly of Deputies, obviously represented the conclusions of the process of ratification of the Treaty of Trianon by the Romanian Parliament. The speaker stressed that there can be no Romanian politician likely to take upon himself the responsibility of not signing or rejecting the Treaty, just because of some partial dissatisfaction, despite any justification, that it might have. The Romanian Foreign Minister insisted on the positive side of the Romanian state policy, whose result was that the Romanian borders were determined by international treaties that provided for a new configuration of law and international relations. These boundaries could have looked different, with a few more favorably looking details, but they certainly could not have been what one wanted or hoped for; Take Ionescu went to great lengths in accounting for these political conclusions (*Desbaterile Sesiunea 1297-1301*). However, at the end of the deliberations, two more statements were added—P. Râmneanţu, on the Banat region, who stated that he would not vote for the ratification and a group of MPs, who were also retired officers, who declared that “only with heavy hearts will we vote for the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary.”

After the vote for ending the deliberations was asked for and accepted, the single article ratifying the Treaty of Trianon was read out and subjected to voting. The result of the vote was the admission of the unique article (*Desbaterile Sesiunea 1302*). Out of 154 votes, the white balls “in favor” were 134 in number and the black balls “against” were 20 in number. This result may be considered as natural, expressing the democratic and open characteristic of the Romanian Parliament’s deliberations on such a crucial issue regarding the situation and international status of the Romanian State. The results of the Parliamentary political analysis and the important decisions adopted, i.e. the ratification by Romania of the Treaty of Trianon, represented an epitome of the constructive perception of the Treaty in the Romanian society, in

the public consciousness of that age, with positive effects over the short- and medium-term perspective regarding the internal and external development of the Romanian State.

The final article of the treaty stipulated that it

shall be ratified. The deposition of ratifications shall be made in Paris as soon as possible. The signatories whose Government does not reside in Europe shall be entitled to give notice to the Government of the French Republic, through their diplomatic representative in Paris, that their ratification has been made, and in this case, will have to forward, as soon as possible, the instrument of ratification. (*Desăvârșirea* 397)

Upon the completion of the ratification procedure, in order to enforce the Treaty, that same final Article 364, stated that

A first process verbal for the deposition of the ratifications will be drawn up as soon as the Treaty has been ratified by Hungary, on one side, and by three of the main Allied and Associated Powers, on the other. Immediately after the conclusion of this first process verbal, the Treaty shall enter into force between the High Contracting Parties, which shall have ratified it in this way. For the calculation of the deadlines included in the present Treaty, this date will be the date of its entry into force. In all other respects, the Treaty will enter into force, for each Power, at the date when its ratification was handed in. The French Government will remit to all the signatory Powers a certified copy compliant with the process verbal accompanying the deposition of the ratifications. (*Desăvârșirea* 398)

Consequently, according to these stipulations, the reference date for the entry into force of the Treaty was to be the date of its being ratified by Hungary and three of the major Powers, the act signed and ratified being designated as the Treaty of Peace with Hungary. The entry into force for each Power was to be considered as the date of the deposition of the ratification. The Treaty ratification roadmap for the signatory Powers began in the summer of 1920. Romania fulfilled this Treaty requirement by discussing the ratification of the Treaty in the Senate and the Assembly of Deputies, from August 14 to August 26, 1920. Most signatory Powers carried through the ratification procedures in the second part of year 1920 and the beginning of the next.

In London, in the House of Commons, the debate regarding the Bill for ratifying the Treaty of Trianon was conducted mainly on April 20, 1921, and continued and ended on April 25 and April 26, 1921. In the House of Lords, the debate took place on May 5, 1921, with conspicuously strong views of both pro and con, and a heated atmosphere of debates.

The Ratification of the Treaty of Trianon by Hungary constituted the most difficult test for the completion and entry into force of the Treaty, as it needed a somewhat longer time, due to its high complexity. On November 15, 1920, the legislative proposal of Pal Teleki's government regarding the "organization of the Trianon Peace" was greeted by the National Assembly with a "Solemn Statement of Protest" (*Magyarország* 876).

The Hungarian ratification process was certainly the most strenuous, the task of promoting it being severe and ungrateful, considering the circumstances that made it necessary for the political-diplomatic decision makers to assume it, despite their known reluctance against the Treaty of Trianon. The decision makers directly in charge had to address in their diplomatic argumentation Hungary's higher *raison d'état*, without being able to withstand the fierce hope of even partial redress. In such a highly tense atmosphere, Istvan Bethlen's new government, through its Foreign Minister, Bánffy Miklos, and at the insistence of some of the Allied Powers, managed to exonerate, on July 26, 1921, the adoption by the National Assembly of Article XXXIII regarding the Treaty of Trianon "as a ratification equivalent" (*Magyarország* 881). Immediately after the adoption of the text, the National Assembly members repeated their protest, in an act to be largely assigned to the general stream of Hungarian revisionism. According to the specifications in the introductory part of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, "from the effective date when the Treaty

enters into force, the state of war will end. From that moment and subject to the provisions of the present Treaty, there will be official relations between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary” (*Desăvârșirea* 274).

Considering the above, we might come to realize the effects of the preposterous hypothesis of rejecting the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon by Hungary or Romania or by any of the Allied Powers, by any High Contracting Party to the Treaty! The unprecedented risk of causing havoc in international relations and the resumption of war, extreme sanctions, could have turned into reality.

The representatives of the Allied Powers concluded in Paris, on July 26, 1921, 18:00 hours, a preliminary protocol which stated that

With the start of the procedure of first depositing the ratifications of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary, signed at Trianon on June 4, 1920, the Allied Powers declare that they reserve all rights that might belong to them as a consequence of the non-execution of the terms of the Armistice or their incomplete execution by Hungary. (*Proces-Verbale 4 iunie 1920*)

On the same day and at the same hour, the same representatives proceeded to prepare the Process-verbal for the deposition of the ratifications of the Treaty of Peace signed at Trianon on June 4, 1920, remitted to the Government of the French Republic (*Proces-Verbal 26 iulie 1921*). The ratification instruments or the notifications regarding their transmission, carried through and considered—upon examination—in good shape and consistent, were entrusted to the Government of the French Republic for safe keeping in its archives. The Process-verbal stated that the deposits were made by four of the major Allied and Associated Powers: the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan—(see also *Proces-Verbal, 31 Octombrie 1921*)—by five other Allied and Associated Powers: Belgium, Romania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Siam and Czechoslovakia and Hungary, mention being made that subsequent deposits shall be approved in accordance with the final clauses of the Treaty.

In this respect, on October 15, 1921 at 11.00 hours, the Procès-verbal of the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon, signed on June 4, 1920, by the King of Greece, was drawn up and remitted by the chargé d'affaires of Greece in Paris; this Procès-verbal was signed only by the representatives of France and Greece, A. Briand and P.A. Metaxas (*Proces-Verbal 15 Octombrie 1921*).

A similar Procès-Verbal was concluded on October 31, 1921, 11.00 hours, for the deposition of the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon by the Emperor of Japan. The Japanese ambassador in Paris informed the French Government via a Note dated July 21, 1921, that the Emperor of Japan had ratified the Treaty (without mentioning the date). Moreover, the Japanese ambassador had attended the first deposition of the Ratifications of July 26, 1921, being one of the signatories of the Procès-verbal (*Proces-Verbal 31 Octombrie 1921*).

Three important steps in the history of the Treaty ratification occurred in the course of the same day of Wednesday, July 26, 1921, which should not be left unnoticed. In the morning, in Budapest, the National Assembly passed “Article XXXIII concerning the Treaty of Peace from Trianon,” which was communicated with maximum urgency to the Government of France, the repository of all Treaty documents. In the wake of this communiqué, in the evening of the same day, July 26, 1921, the Protocol by which the Allied Powers reserve all the rights they might enjoy in the case Hungary eventually failed to comply, was signed in Paris, at 18.00 hours. At the same time, the signature of the first Procès-verbal of the deposition of the Treaty Ratifications by the first ten States, was also recorded. Its importance lies in the fact that it was the main legal document allowing the entry into force of the Treaty. The fast pace of the chronology of the above-mentioned episodes is also indicative of the way all the factors involved worked for the implementation of the clauses assumed in the Treaty. It should be ascertained that in none of the documents regarding the above Ratifications could one find the date of the conclusion or implementation of the ratification procedure by the signatory States of the Treaty.

After July 26, 1921, the ratification deposition schedule included the USA, China, Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland and Portugal. This set was later joined by ten further signatories of the Covenant of the League of Nations, included as Part 1 of the Treaty of Trianon, and their ratification, respectively (Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Peru, Uruguay). Mention should also be made that the conduct and the content of the debates on all these ratifications are still little known, in most cases.

The moment when the Hungarian ratification and the ratifications made until that date by most signatory Powers were placed on record, marked the actual entry into force of the Treaty between the High Contracting Parties. The deposition of the Ratifications and the remission of the certified copies were bound to end in the following time interval.

The extent to which one has complied with the Treaty of Trianon provisions should be considered in its fullness, not only formally and judicially, but as part of the whole that forms the actual entry into force of an act of fundamental international impact, implemented through the full exertion of the force of law, the will and unanimous and integral political power, from the angle of the broad enactment of the international relations that were bound to derive from it.

For any political reference, the date of the Treaty of Trianon is the date when the act was signed, i.e. June 4, 1920, while for the historical reference, the date is the effective date of its entry into force, when its ratification by Hungary and by the majority of the signatory Powers became of public record.

Romania was at the forefront of these developments, both in its capacity of signatory Power of the Treaty alongside the other Allied and Associated Powers and on account of the ratio of the Treaty provisions assigned to it. Last but not least, the implications envisaged the establishment of normal relations with Hungary for both Romania and the other signatory Powers. In the wake of the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary became again, after nearly four centuries, an independent state. Thus, the Treaty of Trianon inaugurated Hungary's diplomatic relations with the signatory Powers. The inauguration of the diplomatic relations between Romania and Hungary was prepared in parallel to the deployment of the Treaty ratification, the way it was proper to do between two new neighboring states, initially as a Mission, then as a Legation.

Conclusions

In all these extensive political and diplomatic developments arising from the establishment, signing, ratification and entry into force of the Treaty of Trianon, the analytical knowledge of the conduct of all ratifications by the signatory Powers is of real scientific interest, if we intend to fully grasp some subtleties and points of view. Close to the centenary from the conclusion of the Treaty, the comparative knowledge and assessment of all ratifications is still at the stage of a mere desideratum. The historiography of the main countries involved in the Treaty of Trianon is still marked by its partial, national-subjective political approach. The historical perspective over the Trianon could facilitate the emergence of a more objective perception of the event. This perspective is however limited by revisionist and neorevisionist bouts with political underpinnings that impair the development of works featuring a comprehensive scientific horizon, of genuine historiological value and sound, principle-based theoretical frame in compliance with 21st century standards.

The previous century featured the polarization of biased views to be found even in works of good repute. This happened in developed countries with valuable historiographical traditions. This is the conclusion one can draw if one goes for an overall assessment of the ratifications of the Treaty of Trianon. Most papers analyze them in revisionist or anti-revisionism terms or via national historiographical overviews. In some Western works, the Treaty of Trianon is seen especially in the light of the Hungarian Question (*The Hungarian Question 1933*), which narrows its historical perspective. The Treaty of Trianon, both as the process and as the product of legal and political ratification, but most particularly as a

fundamental historic act, means much more than the “Hungarian Question,” it means the sum—not necessarily the arithmetical one—but rather the organic fusion of all the issues related to peace and international relations in the post-war period until today and looking forward into the future.

Irrespective of the differences of opinion and interests, or even sharp contradictions in some cases, in absolutely all cases, the higher political interest, the *raison d'état* had to prevail, as it accounted for the very existence and future of each State, and it was this *raison d'état* that eventually leveled out seemingly irreconcilable asperities, because they were conducted under the aegis of the Peace Conference forum. Above all this turmoil, World Peace as a supreme imperative prevailed and all the stakeholders involved in these long-range political and diplomatic developments had to comply with it. These objective, scientific findings, of a universal nature, completely remove all speculative endeavors to redefine the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary through the gross falsification of its title as the Trianon DIKTAT. This manipulation turns out to be increasingly offensive, unacceptable, provocative, utterly dangerous, requiring the international community to apply a rigorous correction. The global dimensions of the issue account for the resulting scientific, historic and fundamental conclusions regarding the importance of the Treaty of Trianon in the contemporary world history. Reason, as an absolute supreme imperative of divine essence, presided over the closure of the great tragedy represented by the First World War, allowing Humanity to return to the wholesome normality of Peace.

The higher *Raison d'états*, which is specific and individual to any State and the Supreme Imperative of International Peace are fundamental factors of permanent validity, to this very day, that underpin international relations. The emergence of the European Union, the European integration of almost all states from the central-east and southeast Europe has opened a new perspective in exploring these universal lessons of history.

Considering that tribulations are still affecting an accurate insight into and proper assessment of the Treaty of Trianon, tribulations that may even affect the conduct of socio-political relations, in particular through the wide practice of political manipulation, the Trianon itself provides us with a more truthful solution, i.e. it opens itself to be read as a valuable chapter of historic culture, as a token of consciousness and responsible reflection in the creative perspective over the world of today and tomorrow.

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Book Review: “Bureaucracy, Thy Name Is Israel”

Reviewed work:

Smadar Lavie. *Wrapped in the Flag of Israel. Mizrahi Single Mothers and Bureaucratic Torture*. Berghahn: New York, 2014. 202 pgs.

At the crossroads between a coursebook,⁷⁸ a piece of writing about life and a feminist manifesto, *Wrapped in the Flag of Israel. Mizrahi Single Mothers and Bureaucratic Torture* is, as the subtitle suggests, both an enlightening insight into Israeli intra-racism and an original and valuable connection between two seemingly unrelated concepts: bureaucracy and torture.

The book is structured in 13 parts: a “Note on Transliteration,” a “List of Illustrations,” an “Introduction,” six chapters—each with several subchapters, a “Glossary of Hebrew, Arabic and Yiddish Terms,” “References,” “Acknowledgements” and an “Index.” The main theoretical concepts throughout the book are “GendeRace,” “Zionism,” “Agency,” and “Identity Politics,” each having its own way of using bureaucracy and perpetrating torture on the Mizrahi single mothers.

The author also draws from epidemiologist Nancy Krieger’s theory that links “chronic bureaucratic entanglements, hypertension, chronic pain and death.” This she further develops as “divine cosmology,” defined as “the Divinity of the Jewish State”—Jewish people’s ‘promised land,’ now a real state, and the “Divinity of Chance”—“the goals the faithful have when they go on pilgrimage.” As these “divinities” suggest, we also have lots of humor in this book:

A welfare mother petitioning a bureaucrat is like a pilgrim beseeching the jawbone of a saint. Mother and pilgrim are bound by the strict script of religious ritual on the one hand, and by serendipity on the other. A mother trying to track down her income augmentation might consult a bureaucrat at the NSB, the post office clerk, an appointed bank official, a case worker at the municipal welfare office, or others. All the while, she is constantly praying for a miracle. None of the avenues is guaranteed to succeed. She has no choice but to subject herself to this godly roulette. Godly it is because both mother and bureaucrat conceive themselves as integral parts of the miraculous ingathering of the Jewish diaspora in the promised land. This is the land of divine bureaucracy governed by ETSBA’ ELOKIM (the finger of God), where citizenship is one guaranteed miracle, so long as you can prove five generations back of Jewish mothers. The other guaranteed miracle of Israeli Jews is an IDF draft notice to report of duty at age eighteen. (19)

The book is all the more interesting for being Smadar Lavie’s personal experience. The daughter of a Mizrahi/Arab/Yemeni⁷⁹ mother and of an Ashkenazi father, she benefitted from a much better education than most Mizrahi women, being raised in a “largely Ashkenazi working-to-middle-class neighborhood less than ten miles south of Tel Aviv” (11). Thus, unlike the average Mizrahi girls, she had access to superior

⁷⁸ The book explains a lot of facts and concepts regarding history, ideology, laws

⁷⁹ Mizrahi—50% of Israel population; they are Easterners or Orientals and have their origins in the Arab and Muslim world and the margins of the Ottoman Empire (Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Bulgaria, former Yugoslavia, India); they are the majority of Israel’s disenfranchised; Ashkenazi—30%; they come from Central and Eastern Europe; they spoke Yiddish; they control the division of power and privilege in the State; other ethnic groups/races: Sephardim Jews (Spaniards), Palestinians (20%), Russim (10-12%), Kavkazim plus Gruzim (2-4%)

education, leading her to the US as a researcher-anthropologist. However, divorce from a violent husband and the loss of her 9-year-child's custody, through a controversial Parental Alienation Syndrome charge,⁸⁰ make her take her child back to her family, in Israel. Here starts her drama as a welfare mother, after having resigned her tenured associate professorship at the University of California, Davis: her color—the Arab phenotype,⁸¹ and her politics—anti-Zionism—exclude her “from academic positions that paid a living wage” (13). Here, she becomes the member of a feminist NGO which actively supports the anti-governmental protests of poor Mizrahi women, such as Vicky Knafo, a protest—the Knafoland—that begins and ends Lavie's book.

As the author declares in the “Introduction,” the purpose of her book is “my simultaneous existence as Mizrahi single mother on welfare, former university professor turned into feminist-of-color activist, and media personality” (22). To which she adds an “attempt to counter Israeli Anthropology's insistence on harmonious finals” (22).

The first important concept, the equivalence between “GendeRace,” bureaucracy and torture, can be explained by starting with the educational system in Israel, a gender-segregated one, with “far fewer classrooms for girls than for boys” (50), with mainly vocational high-schools (seamstresses, knitting, weaving), with fewer kindergartens only in the evenings. In other words, “inferior education, if any at all” (50). Bureaucracy, associated with physical force, is the educational officials' argument for enrolling “into boarding schools or kibbutzim any children about the normative two-child family” (51). There, “the Ashkenazi educators made sure that the boarded Mizrahi children would not intermingle with the superior Ashkenazi children” (51).

Work in Israel is another “GendeRaced” issue. Not only did and do the favored Ashkenazi women have difficulties in finding a job and face lower wages than Ashkenazi men, but, well into the 1960s, the Arab Jews were the domestic servants, cleaners, launderers and agricultural workers. They were battered by their employers, and they were victims of “sexual abuse and rape.” As feminists in the 1990s and the 2000s, Mizrahi NGOs are not allowed to “educate our communities on feminism of color” (61).

As single mothers, they are too fond of the Jewish State to be really able-willing to fight “the somatic pain inflicted upon them by the state's bureaucracy,” which means queuing in huge lines at the welfare bureau, with endless papers to be filled in, in order to try to obtain their monthly income check:

Even though she moves through time and space, she can only move through the time and space allotted by the regime. Because she loves her Jewish homeland and fears that genuine resistance will weaken her homeland's stand against the Goyim,⁸² she can enact only a figurative simulacrum of resistance. The regime merely lays its web in wait for her to entangle herself. (81)

Another bureaucratic shortcoming is ambiguity and evasiveness, lack of any obvious rules, plus the demand of sexual favors by the clerks and/or potential employers, turning any success at the bureau into “a miracle.” The mother does not know and has no way of knowing, which actions correlate with success or failure” (82). Finally, the single mother is practically denied even the chances of obtaining her money through court. All judges care for are endless fees, papers, signatures and stamps, all these involving much more money than any Mizrahi single mother may produce. In other words, “Government bureaus are where the Divinity of Chance meets the Divinity of the State” (84).

⁸⁰ Parental Alienation Syndrome—PAS—the assumption that a child estrangement from a violent father most likely precipitates from the mother causing alienation between the father and child (26)

⁸¹ Yemeni race marks: olive-chocolate skin and dark brown eyes, wide eyelids, high cheekbones, prominent collarbone and wrist bones, narrow waistline with wide hips, short torso and Asian height (14)

⁸² Goyim—non-Jew; Arab

Speaking about this “Divinity of the State,” Zionism is another central factor linked with bureaucracy and torture.

Defined as a “European ideology of Jewish nationalism whose main goal was to colonize Palestine in order to establish a Jewish State” (61), an ideology which perceives Arabs as “primitives,” Zionism is the “destruction of Palestinian villages” (61) and the portrayal of counter-reactions as “pogroms” (61). Today, it means a huge social-economic gap between the Ashkenazi ruling minority and the Mizrahi lower-class majority. It means discriminatory education, employment and wages, plus the denial of “Arab culture and Orthodox Judaism.” It means the master narrative of the fight against the Goyim. And it means that “from the cradle to donning military fatigues at age eighteen, all Israel citizens tracing Jewish lineage learned that their most vital responsibility to the state was in creating new generations of Jewish citizens. Judaism is citizenship” (61). Finally, for Smadar Lavie, it meant not being allowed to study Jewish intra-racism as a tenured professor, the only recommended field being the binary Israel-Palestinian conflict.

The last two inter-twined concepts, “agency” and “identity politics” are direct consequences of GendeRace and Zionism. We are talking about Hebrew media stereotypes of Mizrahi single mothers⁸³ and we are talking about the denial of their agency through the “mirage of Mizrahi Ashkenazi Jewish unity to narrate how all Jews should fight on a single front so Israel—the little David—can survive surrounded by Arab Goyim Goliath” (79). As Smadar Lavie explains, this is just a mask to hide the State’s use of bureaucracy “to crush, marginalize, contain and buy out individuals or groups within social protest movements.” The only protests allowed are those that “showcase the ‘chosen people’s’ national unity devoid of race, class or religious observance. Movements that do not showcase this national unity are ignored. Eventually, all Mizrahi movements become sucked into the Palestine-Israel binary and then disappear from the public sphere” (80).

Another way of denying such agency is the impossibility of turning bureaucratic pain into discourse. According to our author’s direct observation, single mothers did not even make the connection between the moment of opening and reading a letter about a new allowance cut or a new paper to be filled in, and their consequent burning of food or yelling at their children.

Unfortunately, Smadar Lavie’s *Knafole* has no happy end. Being a book about reality, one of Israel’s realities happened to be a “Palestinian suicide bomber” who killed 23 and injured 130, thus ending both the truce between Israel and Hamas and the national and international media attention towards the Mizrahi feminist protest. No solutions to their problems. Only the warning that, should their children fail to be at school come 1 September, they would be reported “as delinquents to the Youth and Family Courts. The judges could then order the removal of the children from their homes to be forcibly placed into boarding schools” (145).

Only one possible ending:

In a press corps’ caravan, they sped across town to cover the carnage at the border. Afterwards, they went to the American Colony Hotel Bar to get drunk. So did I, with my converted food coupons to purchase a drink I would muse for hours and my California English to gather info. Forever the anthropologist, forever collecting data. (145)

⁸³ Mizrahi single mothers: “bleached blonde hair, skinny jeans, smoking expensive import cigarettes – proof of their loose morals and wastefulness” (68)